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CASH HOLDINGS AND MARKET SHARE GROWTH. EUROPEAN EVIDENCE 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to study whether a firm’s high cash holdings can lead to 
future market share gains in the product markets. I study the cash holdings and market 
share changes in the industry-related terms. I am also interested in finding differences in 
the impact between countries and industry and rival characteristics. Last, I study how 
the cash holdings have impacted the market share changes in the recent financial crisis 
from 2008-2009. 
DATA 
My data consist of financial statement data from European public firms. I use data from 
22 European countries. All the observed firms are manufacturing companies denoted 
with SIC codes from 2000 to 3999. The time period of the study is from 1990 to 2009. 
For the study of the recent financial crisis I use data from 2008 to 2009. All the data is 
retrieved from Thomson One Banker. 
RESULTS 
I use the instrumental variable approach to avoid reversal causality between the cash 
holdings and future market share changes. From the total observed time period I find no 
evidence for cash holdings to improve a firm’s market share in the following years. 
Neither the industry or rival characteristics make difference for the results. When I 
estimate the cash holdings impact on future market share changes in the recent financial 
crisis, I find significant evidence. For example, a one standard deviation from the 
industry-average cash holdings increases the future market share with 1.6 percent during 
a financial crisis.  
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CASH HOLDINGS AND MARKET SHARE GROWTH. EUROPEAN EVIDENCE 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tämä pro gadu- tutkielman tarkoituksena on tutkia voivatko yrityksen korkeat 
kassavarat johtaa markkinaosuuden kasvuun tuotemarkkinoilla tulevaisuudessa. Tutkin 
kassavaroja ja markkinaosuuden muutosta muuttujilla, jotka ovat suhteessa kunkin 
teollisuudenalaan. Tarkoituksena on myös tutkia pätevätkö samat tulokset myös 
riippuen maasta, jossa yritys toimii, ja teollisuuden alan ja kilpailijoiden piirteistä. 
Lopuksi pyrin selvittämään miten yrityksen kassavarat ovat vaikuttaneet 
markkinaosuuden kasvattamiseen viimeisessä talouskriisissä vuosina 2008 ja 2009. 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Lähdeaineistoni koostuu tilinpäätöstiedoista Eurooppalaisista julkisista yrityksista. 
Käytän tutkimuksessa yritysten tietoja 22 eurooppalaisesta maasta. Kaikki havainnoidut 
yritykset ovat tuotantoyrityksiä, jotka on määritelti SIC koodein 2000-3999. 
Tutkimuksen aikaperiodi on vuodesta 1990 vuoteen 2000. Viimeisimmän talouskriisin 
tutkimiseen käytän dataa vuosilta 2008 ja 2009. Kaikki lähdetieto yrityksistä on 
Thomson One Banker- palvelusta. 
TULOKSET  
Käytän instrumental variable- metodia välttääkseni vastakkaisen kausaalisuuden 
yrityksen kassavarojen ja tulevan markkinaosuuden välillä. Koko tutkitusta ajanjaksosta 
en löydä tuloksia, jotka tukisivat hypoteesia yrityksen kassavarojen ja tulevan 
markkinaosuuden kasvattamisen välillä. Myöskään yrityksen kotimaa, teollisuuden ala 
tai kilpailijoiden piirteet eivät vaikuta tuloksiin. Kun tutkin yrityksen kassavarojen 
vaikutusta markkinaosuuden kansvattamiseen viimeisen talouskriisin ajalta, löydän 
tuloksia, jotka tukevat hypoteesia. Esimerkiksi, yksi keskihajonnan muutos 
teollisuudenalan keskimääräisistä kassavaroista kasvattaa yrityksen tulevaa 
markkinaosuutta 1.6% taloudellisen kriisin aikana.  
AVAINSANAT 
Kassa, yrityksen kassavarat, markkinaosuus, tuotantoyritykset, talouskriisi 
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1. Introduction 
Industrial US corporations have increased their cash balances almost by doubling them 
from 1980’s to the first decade of the 21st century. They have achieved cash ratios strong 
enough to be able to pay off all of their debt obligations (see Bates, Kahle and Stulz 
(2009)). This has not succeeded without a notice from the stakeholders. Activists have 
been stalking companies that hoard cash, and have started to view them with suspicion.
1
 
The agency costs related to cash holdings have lead shareholders to doubt the real value of 
their investments. But a change in this setting happened in the fall of 2008, at the peak of 
the recent financial crisis, when the game to find money started. Even the most solid 
companies had to participate in the rivalry to stay in product markets. 
 
In their survey of credit constraints, Campello et al. (2010) find that the cash ratios of 
constrained firms fell by one-fifth during one year in the recent financial crisis (from Q4 
2007 to Q4 2008). For the unconstrained firms the loss was non-existent. These firms with 
felling cash ratios had to change their financials and operations by cutting in investments, 
technology, marketing and employment. But “for the lucky hoarders, this is the time to 
feel both smug and predatory” was stated.2 For example, Microsoft held enough cash to 
survive a year without any sales. They had a potential even to support suppliers in 
financial troubles. A survey of Citigroup showed that cash hoarders outperform better than 
indebted firms even though they have lagged them before. The outperformance has been 
around 7%.
3
 
 
After the crisis the attitude towards cash holdings is no longer so self-evident. Thus, the 
crisis can give us new proof of economic patterns which are applicable for firms’ cash 
management in the future. The strategic significance of cash holdings, which has 
increased in importance after the financial crisis, has not been very thoroughly studied in 
financial literature. For example, Fresard (2010) is the first one to find evidence the real 
effect of cash holdings on product market outcomes. He suggests that firms holding more 
                                                          
1
 “All you need is cash“, Economist, 20th November 2008. 
(www.economist.com/node/12637043?story_id=E1_TNGPSDQP) 
2
 “All you need is cash“, Economist, 20th November 2008. 
(www.economist.com/node/12637043?story_id=E1_TNGPSDQP) 
3
 “Desperately seeking a cash cure”, Economist, 20th November 2008. 
(www.economist.com/node/12636353?story_id=E1_TNGPGPVP) 
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cash than their industry on average are able to increase their future industry-related market 
share. It is important to know what kind of strategic dimensions cash holdings can give to 
a firm in different economic situations, in order to improve its performance and increase 
its value in the eyes of the owners. In his analysis of competitive advantage Porter (1980) 
lists the excess cash reserves as one of the top tools for a firm to signal its power of 
staying in a market.  
 
The literature on cash holdings and product market performance has been fragmented. 
Before Fresard’s (2010) study they had not been discussed under any strategic focus. The 
past discussion of cash holdings has attempted to understand which determinants lead 
firms to increase their cash ratios and how they affect firm performance. In connection 
with the product markets, cash holdings have been less in focus, and instead, the main 
drivers for product market outcomes have been capital structure and leverage. Several 
implications of debt on firm performance have been empirically studied and evidence both 
for and against debt’s influence in improvement of product market outcomes have been 
recorded (see e.g. Campello (2006)). 
 
Finance literature has suggested several determinants for cash holdings. Haushalter (2007) 
suggests that the cash holdings are a result of three factors, namely a firm’s financing, 
investment opportunities and product markets. Opler et al. (1999) support this with 
empirical evidence: strong growth opportunities, riskier activities and small firms tend to 
hold more cash in relation to non-cash assets. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) record 
doubling cash ratios for the US industrial firms. They suggest that the main driver, 
according to the top management, has been the increasing risk of the cash flows in the 
course of the years. This means that the precautionary motive of cash holdings, first stated 
by Keynes (1936), has played an important role. In addition, Jensen’s (1969) free cash 
flow theory (agency theory) drives cash balances. The conflict between managers and 
shareholders gets tougher especially when a firm generates excess cash flows and the 
probability of damaging overinvestment increases (Chen et al. (2011)).  
 
Are these increasing cash balances, then, in optimal use from the shareholders’ point of 
view? If the case is that the riskier business environment has lead firms to increase their 
liquidity the cash piles should be used strategically and efficiently. It would be valuable to 
understand what strategic and value enhancing dimensions the cash holdings possess. If 
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the top management understands the meaning of the high cash ratio, it can give relevant 
guidance in firms’ financial planning, behavior in competitive markets and forecasting to 
prepare for potential future shocks in the economic environment and product markets. 
Evidence of implications to firm performance and behavior has been suggested. Harford 
(1999) finds, in line with the free cash flow hypotheses, that the excess cash leads to 
unsuccessful acquisition activities. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) suggest that firms with 
high cash holdings use them in asset growth which does not necessary lead to improved 
performance in sales. Fresard (2010) finds evidence that the higher cash holdings relative 
to rivals improve the firm performance measured with return on assets.  
 
In addition to the performance aspect, cash holdings are related to competition and 
predation in product markets. A firm incapable to react to changes in product markets can 
end up being predated out of the market. For example, cash holdings can enable a firm to 
respond quickly to new opportunities by constructing entry barriers and allow it to 
monopolize the market in a situation where an entrant is trying to create competition 
(Baskin (1987)). Besides, cash rich firms aim to enforce their financially constrained 
competitors out of the product market by mediating their competitors’ cash flow (Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1990)). The model of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) shows how a firm’s 
ability to finance investments and decrease the financial distress with internally generated 
funds can mitigate the risk of predation and lead to success on the product markets. My 
interest in this thesis is to find new evidence of cash holdings and product markets in the 
light of the theories and previous literature presented above. 
 
1.1. Motivation 
I argue that the implications of cash holdings should be available for firms, so that they 
can use the cash holdings as a strategic tool in product market actions and improve firm 
performance to create value for shareholders. As Haushalter et al.(2007) comment more 
research should focus on strategic and competitive advantage following from the cash 
holdings. The purpose of my thesis is to contribute to the implications of cash holdings in 
product markets, and to empirically test whether Fresard’s (2010) findings are applicable 
worldwide. Following Fresard (2010), I hypothesize that high cash holdings lead to future 
market share gains. My aim is to test whether the relative to rivals cash holdings can give 
a strategic tool for firms to improve their performance in the product markets relative to 
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rivals. The improvement is measured as the industry-related market share increase. To test 
the hypothesis, I use European data to find the empirical connection. 
 
My thesis follows the theoretical frame of Fresard (2010). First, I will study the link 
between cash holdings and future industry-related market share growth. My will 
concentrate on the relation with one- and two-years lagged cash holdings. I use the 
instrumental variable approach to manage the endogeneity bias relating to cash holdings 
and market share growth, and instrument the cash holdings with Tangiblity and one- and 
two-year lagged cash holdings. With the instrumented cash holdings, I test the impact on 
future market share growth.   
 
Secondly, I run the basic estimation with subsamples including French, German and 
British data. Fresard (2010) uses a sample from the Compustat database to study cash 
holdings effect with the American data. In this thesis I use heterogeneous European data 
to test whether there are any country specific differences in the effect. I try to discover 
whether the estimation with the subsamples follows the same pattern as the hypothesis 
with the total sample.  
 
Third, I study the cash holdings implications on market share growth with different rival 
and industry characteristics. I anticipate the results to show that a positive magnitude of 
cash holdings on market share growth depends on the competitors’ financial status. The 
same trend should follow when the industry is highly competitive. I test whether the 
magnitude of the cash holdings impact differs in the subsamples where the rivals’ 
financial distress is either high or low, and where the industry is either highly competitive 
or concentrated. To confirm that the competition between the firms is defined correctly, I 
study whether the industries operating and competing globally give similar results 
compared to industries operating only locally. My aim is to find out whether locally 
operating industries which are not part of the global competition change the results I find 
from the total sample.  
 
Finally, I hypothesize that, in the frame of the recent financial crisis, firms which had high 
cash holdings before the crisis should show strong market share growth now that the crisis 
settles down. This is also Fresard’s (2010) concludings argument in his study, and I find it 
relevant to study. He run a quasi-natural experiment in his study and suggests that when 
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the economy faces intensification in the product markets those with high cash holdings 
will perform better. Studying the time period of the recent financial crisis should provide 
results supporting the argument that the causal link between cash and market share growth 
is applicable in a shocking situation in the economic environment.  
 
I test the cash holdings effect with a sample of financial statements data from European 
public firms. The finance literature of cash holdings mainly focuses on American data and 
it is valuable to see whether the evidence applies, in Europe too. The European data might 
reflect different management behavior of cash piling and the use of cash holdings. The 
sample consists of 3770 firms from 22 European countries. All the sample firms operate in 
manufacturing industries. I use such a wide data sample to be able to create reliable 
industries denoted with SIC codes.
4
 Every industry year must include at least five industry 
year observations. The time period of the study is from 1990 to 2009. This period includes 
economic booms as well as downturns, and it gives me the opportunity to study how the 
cash holdings effect applies in the recent financial crisis. I am able to study the time of the 
recent financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and how the pre-crisis cash holdings have 
influenced the product market outcomes when the net loans to large firms decreased 
heavily (see e.g. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)).  
 
1.2. Main findings 
I find divergent evidence for cash holdings impact on market share growth. For the total 
sample period, I find no evidence of cash holdings impact on industry-related market 
share increase. Instead, my findings for the baseline estimation for the total time period 
suggest that a firm’s size has a negative impact on the future market share increase, in 
contrast to Fresard’s (2010) findings. The results also support the previously suggested 
notion that leverage supports positive outcomes in the product market performance in the 
short term, but in a longer time period, leverage destroys the positive development.  
 
I find support for my main hypothesis when I study the time period, the years 2008 and 
2009 of the recent financial crisis. The industry-related market share changes seem to be 
explained significantly with the two-year lagged cash holdings, i.e. the cash holdings in 
                                                          
4
 SIC codes are discussed in Section 4.1.1. Sample construction. 
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the end of the years 2006 and 2007. The positive impact is significant with additional 
control variables. The negative size impact holds also in this time period. Leverage holds 
its positive impact but loosens the significance of its impact.  
 
My findings from the subsamples of French, German and British data are in line with the 
results from the total sample for the full time period. They do not indicate any strong 
impact of high cash holdings to future market share growth. The results for the different 
countries diverge only slightly, as the coefficients for the cash holdings do not differ 
between the countries and are close to zero. I find differences in the control variables 
compared to the baseline estimation with the total data.  
 
The results on rival’s and industry characteristics do not differ from the results of the basic 
estimation. The estimated impact of cash holdings to future industry-related market share 
increase is not significant and not in line with Fresard’s (2010) results. My findings do not 
support the hypothesis that firms operating in an industry where rivals are more 
financially constrained would benefit more from the cash holdings impact. The same 
applies for the industry concentration. My research of the two subsample groups created, 
based on the globalization of their operations, yield similar results. It cannot be argued 
that the cash holdings impact on market share growth is dependent on the level the firm 
and its competitors operate globally. My subgroups of the most and least global industries 
do not at all yield positive and significant results; in contrast there is slight evidence that 
the locally operating industries might suffer from high cash holdings if they aim to 
improve their market share. 
 
1.3. The structure of the thesis 
This thesis follows the subsequent structure: In Section 2, I discuss the recent literature of 
the determinants of cash holdings and its implications in the product market outcomes, as 
well as the effect of debt. In Section 3, I construct the hypotheses of cash holdings effect, 
in Section 4, I describe the data and the empirical methods used in the study and in 
Section 5, I report and analyze the empirical findings. Section 6 is dedicated to 
conclusions and suggestions for further study. 
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2. Literature review 
The following literature review introduces of recent studies of capital structure, cash 
holdings and product market dynamics. The objective is firstly to show how the 
determinants of product market outcomes have been studied from the debt and cash 
perspectives, and secondly that there is further need for research on the strategic meaning 
cash holdings in the product market competition. The literature related to cash holdings 
can be divided into studies of the determinants of cash holdings and other studies 
concentrating influence of the capital structure on product market performance. Since 
little has been written on the impact of cash holdings on product market outcomes so far, I 
find it relevant to first briefly review the relation between debt and product market 
performance. The review is organized as follows: first I discuss how debt and financial 
distress interrelate with product market actions and outcomes, then I review the literature 
which has discovered empirical findings on the determinants of cash holdings, in the end I 
discuss how cash holdings can be used in a strategic way to improve firm performance in 
product markets.  
2.1. Debt and product market performance 
In this section, I discuss the recent and some of the most important studies on the 
empirical relation between debt and financial distress to product market behavior and firm 
performance. These studies increase our knowledge by providing new results in the field 
of debt, and they follow the previous literature on capital structure and its implications on 
firm performance, financing costs and firm valuation (see e.g. Campello(2006)). Before 
the newest studies of the impact of cash holdings on product market behavior were 
published leverage seemed to be the interpretive factor for the product market outcomes 
(see e.g. Opler and Titman (1994) and Campello (2003, 2006)). These results are reviewed 
in the following sections.  
 
 Financial distress and predation 2.1.1.
The risk of underinvestment leading to a loss of investment opportunities and market 
share to product market rivals is referred to as predation risk (Haushalter et al., 2007). 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) were one of the first ones to add new knowledge of how 
information and incentive problems in the capital markets can determine outcomes in the 
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product markets. Their model of predation and financial distress confirms how important 
internally generated funds are if positive results in the product market competition are to 
be achieved.  
 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) show how financial distress can be costly for a firm in the 
product markets if its weakened condition induces an aggressive response from the 
competitors which seize the opportunity to gain market share. In Bolton and Scharfstein’s 
(1990) theory the financing contracts, which can terminate financing if a firm performs 
poorly, tempt competitors into the market to ensure the poor performance and an exit from 
the market when the contract ends. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) focus closely on the 
“deep-pockets” theory of predation where cash rich firms aim to force the financially 
constrained competitors out of the product market by mediating the competitors’ cash 
flow. This theory emphasizes the importance of the capital structure and internal financing 
of firms in order them to be able to defend themselves against predation. It also serves as a 
motivator to actively invest into the company’s strategies to stay in the competition. 
Because it is easier for the financially solid companies to defend their market positions, 
they can try to lower the new-comer’s cash flow with different strategies, e.g. decreasing 
prices, investing in advertising etc., to prey it out of the markets.  
 
This predation risk model shows how a firm’s ability to finance investments with 
internally generated funds, and thus decrease the financial distress, can mitigate the risk of 
predation and lead into success on the product markets. On the other hand, a firm needs to 
have the ability to create financial contracts with better chances for the refinancing 
decision in order to avoid the unfavorable situation of predation from competitors.  
 
 Debt’s two-fold impact on product market performance 2.1.2.
Most of the studies on the impact of capital structure on product markets focus on 
leverage’s impact on company performance (see e.g. Jensen (1989), Opler and Titman 
(1994), Campello (2003) and Campello (2006)). The studies also confirm the indirect 
costs of financial distress (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990), and point out financial 
distress’ significance. The results show consistency both with the favorable impacts of 
debt and its negative influence. There has not been any clear consensus of which impact is 
the most relevant.  
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Debt can improve the performance of a company because managers are placed in a 
position where they have to make choices to maximize the value of the company. When 
companies have such debt levels that they cannot meet their debt service they are forced to 
rethink their strategy and structures. The management is forced to adopt value-creating 
processes by cutting costs, disposing unprofitable assets and restructuring their investment 
programs. (Jensen, 1989) This mitigates agency problems, as well, and improves company 
performance. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) conclude their study of optimal financial 
contracts by stating that external financing comes with costs and benefits. External finance 
can discipline the management, but it also makes the firm vulnerable in its product 
markets due to predation risk.  
 
Opler and Titman (1994), for example, report of the negative impacts of debt. They study 
indirect costs of financial distress by focusing on industries experiencing economic 
distress and downturn. Their results show that when there is an industry downturn highly 
leveraged companies lose significantly more market share than their competitors that are 
more conservatively financed. The firms in the top decile of an industry facing output 
contractions are more heavily affected by sales decrease than the companies in the bottom 
decile. The sales decline is 26 % more for the top leveraged firms. The results are more 
significant on firms with high R&D expenditure (production of special products) and on 
those operating in more concentrated markets. These results confirm that the decreasing 
sales growth cannot be caused only by the managers narrowing the operations, rather it is 
due to competitive actions in the product market and to customer reactions.  
 
Campello (2003) studies the effects of capital structure on product market outcomes for a 
large cross-section of industries from a several-year time period. His focus is on the 
changes of industry- related sales growth, and especially, on the differences in responses 
to firm sales-leverage sensitivity when there are changes in the macroeconomic 
conditions. The difficult causality between the company’s financial structure and 
competitive performance, and the unobservable factors in the market environment, are 
handled by using shocks to mitigate the potential reversal causality, and to simulate an 
exogenous impact. The results are provided on firm and industry level. Campello’s (2003) 
results show that debt financing has a negative impact on the industry-related sales growth 
when rivals are relatively unlevered during recession, but not during booms. For example, 
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a 1% decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) has a greater impact on a firm which 
relies more on debt financing than the industry on average, when the industry is less 
leveraged. When the industry, in general, is more leveraged the impact disappears.  
 
On the other hand, Campello (2006) reports results that contradict the previous research 
on the implications of debt financing on product market outcomes. This study suggests 
that the outcomes can be both positive and negative, implying that moderate debt taking 
boosts relative-to-rivals sales growth, and higher debt levels lead to hurting product 
market performance. Firms having clearly higher debt levels than their industry on 
average expand their industry-related sales relatively more than others in future years. 
This “leverage effect” faces anyway a threshold; after passing it the effect only leads to 
sales underperformance. 
 
Campello (2006) also notes different results for industries having dissimilar concentration. 
If a leader firm, in concentrated markets, has a higher leverage than the industry on 
average expanding sales with increased leverage levels is no longer possible. On the 
contrary, the less leveraged leader has a higher potential to increase sales through 
increasing debt levels.  
 
2.2. Determinants of cash 
In the finance discussion cash has been highlighted in several topics, such as cash 
holdings valuation (see e.g. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) and Faulkender and Wang, 
(2006)), firm performance (see e.g. Mikkelson and Partch (2003)), and, most recently, as a 
strategic tool to compete with in the product markets (Fresard, 2010). It is valuable not 
only to understand the relevance of cash for these topics, and especially for the product 
markets, but also to understand what the motives behind them are. Earlier literature has 
tried to determine what drives companies to increase their cash ratios in front of the 
investors and other stakeholders in the markets. The challenge is that managers and 
shareholders view the costs and benefits differently (Opler et al. (1999)). In their study of 
product market’s influence on cash holdings, Haushalter et al. (2007) conclude that cash 
holdings are an equilibrium outcome from several determinants which relate to a firm’s 
financing, investment opportunities and the product markets. In addition, management that 
maximizes shareholder wealth should set the firm’s cash holdings at such a level that the 
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marginal benefit of cash holdings equals their marginal cost. These three factors are 
mingled with the determinants of cash holdings described in the literature, as above. In the 
following sections, I describe the main determinants and discuss how they are potentially 
linked with product market behavior. 
 
 Transaction motive 2.2.1.
One of the first motives for cash holdings has been stated by Keynes (1936) who divided 
the motives into two factors: the transaction motive and precautionary cash holdings. 
Behind Keynes’ (1936) idea of the transaction motive are the saved costs of liquidating 
assets to make transactions. If an illiquid company has to raise capital from external 
markets to make transactions, it suffers from extra costs which the liquid competitor can 
save. The transaction motive also reflects the potential situation of a company not being 
able to invest in upcoming investment opportunities due to lack of liquid assets and costly 
external capital. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that managers may refuse to issue new equity to take new 
investment projects because the old shareholders might not see the investment possibility 
as valuable as the management due to asymmetric information. It might be optimal for the 
company to reserve extra cash levels to be able to meet the investment opportunities 
without issuing new stock. This can be seen as a result of the precautionary cash holdings 
motive but also as a transaction motive to be able to carry out investments without any 
loss of value of the equity. 
 
 Precautionary motive 2.2.2.
Keynes (1936) was first who argued for the precautionary motive. He defined 
precautionary motive as a firm’s or individual’s need for cash to hedge against sudden 
expenditure caused by upcoming investments opportunities and unexpected purchases. 
The precautionary motive for corporate cash holdings has not been modeled widely, and 
most of the studies (such as Almeida et al. (2004) and Han and Qiu (2007)) have focused 
on showing how cash flow volatility affects a firm’s decisions of cash holdings (see e.g. 
Opler et al. (1999)).  
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In Opler et al.’s (1999) study of the determinants and implications of cash holdings, the 
evidence is consistent with the arguments for the precautionary motives. They discover 
that the companies that have to strive more to find external financing tend to hold more 
cash than those with freer access to capital markets (larger firm, and/or higher credit 
ratings). They suggest that management accumulates cash if it has the opportunity to do 
so, and the motive is the precautionary motive. Opler et al. (1999) suggest that further 
research should be conducted to find out whether management can avoid making changes 
in the firm policies and operations in difficult economic times if it has had the possibility 
to increase cash levels to cover future difficulties. They also state that if this is the case it 
would not be surprising that the management is less concerned of increasing cash levels 
than the shareholders might be.  
 
Han and Qiu (2007) base their study on the previous work of Almeida et al. (2004) and 
the early arguments from Keynes (1936) on the precautionary cash holdings. They analyze 
how financial distress impacts on precautionary corporate cash holdings. Their study is 
based on testing the argument that a financially constrained firm cannot make additional 
future investments without reducing current investment because it has already used all the 
external financing. The firm has to hold more cash to be able to invest more in the future. 
This reflects the precautionary cash holdings: when the future cash flows are volatile the 
company has to increase cash holdings by cutting current investments. Han and Qiu 
(2007) find empirical evidence for these arguments.  Their results apply only to the 
financially constrained companies, though; there is no systematic relationship between 
cash holdings and cash flow volatility of unconstrained firms.  
 
While studying the increasing cash holdings of the US industrial firms Bates, Kahne and 
Stulz (2009) find out that the firm’s cash holdings increase because they become riskier. 
This in line with the Lins et al.’s (2010) survey where the Chief Financial Officers 
answered that holding non-operational cash is thought to guard against future cash slow 
shocks in bad times. They also argue that the precautionary demand for cash should have 
decreased due to new derivatives available for companies to hedge their operations.  
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 Free cash flow theory 2.2.3.
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory (also referred to as the agency theory), even though 
it is not an empirically tested factor for high cash holdings, relates essentially to a 
company’s cash holdings anyway. Managers are dealing with different views of their 
company. Managers have plans for value creating investments, but on the other hand 
shareholders might want to receive excess cash as dividends or share repurchases if they 
cannot see the investment plans as valuable as the managers. According to Jensen (1986), 
the conflicts between the stakeholders are especially severe when the firm generates cash 
holdings that substantially exceed the needed funds to finance projects with positive net 
present value.  
 
Chen et al. (2011) argue that free cash flows can be used as a proxy for the potential 
damage caused by overinvestment. Managers of high free cash flows can finance projects 
with internal funds and this way escape the monitoring of the capital markets. The risk of 
the funds being invested in a damaging way increases. Chen et al.(2011) suggest that 
shareholders’ rights matter most in reducing the cost of equity capital when the agency 
problem of free cash flow is severe. This implies that the free cash flow dilemma does not 
lead only to potential damages of overinvestment but also to abnormally high cost of 
capital. 
 
 Firm-specific factors 2.2.4.
It is important to understand how different kinds of firm specific factors, as a result of a 
dynamic environment, contribute to the levels of cash holdings in companies. Haushalter 
et al. (2007) suggest that three factors affect the cash holdings: a firm’s financing, its 
investment opportunities and the product markets. In addition, Taimisto (2010) concludes 
from the earlier theories that cash holdings are less of a strategic choice and more of a 
result of a dynamic and endogenous process. In this part of the literature review, I review 
studies of firm specific factors which contribute to the level of cash holdings. 
 
Opler et al. (1999) study firm specific factors which increase or decrease liquid assets, 
cash and marketable securities on a firm’s balance sheet. They suggest that firms with 
strong growth opportunities and riskier activities, and small firms, tend to hold more cash 
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in relation to non-cash assets. Firms having better access to the capital markets, i.e. large 
firms and firms with higher credit ratings, seem to hold lower levels of cash than total 
non-cash assets. These results support the argument that firms holding large amounts of 
excess cash have gained them through accumulating internal funds. This is in line with 
Chudson’s (1945) study which shows that cash-to-asset ratios tend to be higher for 
profitable companies. In addition, John’s (1993) results support the arguments that 
companies with higher financial distress costs, high market-to-book ratios and low 
tangible asset ratios tend to hold more cash on their balance sheet. 
 
Almeida et al. (2004) highlight the importance of financial distress in the cash holdings 
discussion as they present a theory of cash flow sensitivity. They argue that for 
constrained firms the probability to save out of cash flow is high, while the cash savings 
of unconstrained firms should not be systematically related to cash flows. Constrained 
firms choose optimal cash policy for balancing the profitability of current and future 
investments by saving a certain amount of cash flows. The results in the study of Almeida 
et al. (2004) confirm their hypothesis. In the results, the tendencies also vary across 
business cycles since constrained firms retain more cash from their cash flows following 
negative macroeconomic shocks. Again, the unconstrained firms do not show this 
tendency.  
 
 Predation risk 2.2.5.
Predation risk, the risk of underinvestment leading to a loss of investment opportunities 
and market share to product market rivals, was already referred to in the first part of the 
literature review of debt and the impact of financial distress on product market behavior. 
In addition to the direct impacts that can be seen on the product markets, predation risk 
also has its influence on firm cash holdings. Cash holdings can be viewed as a hedge 
against the potential losses which might occur on the product markets due to the risk. (see 
e.g. Haushalter et al.(2007)).  
 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) created a model of optimal financial contracting to 
minimize the potentiality of predatory threat. In addition, they suggest with empirical 
results that the threat of predatory pricing and actions lead companies to increase their 
cash levels to be able to react to competitors’ predatory behavior. This applies when a 
15 
 
 
firm is in financial distress and has difficulties with refinancing. Bolton and Scharfstein’s 
(1990) model suggests that the degree to which firms can finance investment with 
internally generated funds is an important determinant of product-market success.  
 
Froot et al.’s (1993) results also support the precautionary theory of cash holdings. When 
external financing is costly a shock which decreases the cash flows can leave an un-
hedged firm unable to finance its investment opportunities and thus lead the firm to suffer 
from the predation risk. If the investment opportunities are interdependent on a certain 
product market the unhedged firm risks losing market share to competitors that are able to 
seize on the investment opportunities due to higher internal funds. 
 
Haushalter et al. (2007) investigate the relation between the role of predation risk and 
corporate financial policy decisions. They focus on the policy decisions by studying how 
derivatives and cash holdings are used to hedge against product market threats. They base 
their research on previous studies which show that the cash holdings have the benefit of 
reducing the predation risk of a firm (see e.g. Opler et al. (1999), Harford et al. (2003), 
Almeida et al. (2004) and Acharya et al. (2004)). Haushalter et al.’s (2007) results show 
that firms are more likely to increase their investment level when investing decreases on 
the industry-level, provided that the firms have larger cash reserves and the 
interdependence of their investment opportunities with rivals is greater. The results are in 
line with Froot et al. (1993), and the results suggest that when the interdependence of 
investment opportunities is high, both within and between industries, a firm’s cash 
holdings increase. Due to predation risk, a firm’s cash holdings are also positively related 
with the industry’s Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index5 and the four-firm concentration 
index which describe how fierce the competition in the industry or market is.  
 
To conclude, corporate policies, such as holding high cash levels, can reduce firms’ 
predation risk, i.e. risk of underinvestment leading to losses of market share and 
investment opportunities. When a firm operates in a highly competitive market it faces 
threats of predation and need cash to hedge against the potential threat. In this study I aim 
to show that this literature and empirical findings still hold.  
 
                                                          
5
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is discussed in Section 4. 
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2.3. Cash holdings and firm performance 
The strategic aim in any business is to bring value to shareholders by improving the firm 
performance. The strategic setting in any business or industry is to create competitive 
advantage for the firm compared to competitors. One way to describe the competitive 
setting is to refer to Porter’s (1980) five forces which construct a basis for business 
analysis. A firm should be able to 1) fight against new entrants in the industry, 2) fight 
against new products in the markets, 3) fight against suppliers’ bargaining power, 4) fight 
against customers’ bargaining power and 5) fight against rivalry between firms in the 
same industry or sector. A firm capable of creating a strategy to fight against these forces 
will need cash to perform it. 
 
The finance scholars have empirically studied how firms holding high cash levels use 
them and how the levels impact on the firm performance and growth. Fresard (2010) is the 
first one to empirically study the strategic impact of cash holdings on a firm’s and its 
rivals’ product market performance. Although he shows a significant causal link between 
past cash holdings and future industry-related market share increase, he does not go 
further to find out the precise channels which are used to gain market share in the product 
markets.  
 
Fresard (2010) also points out the difficulty of linking cash to product market behavior, as 
it is not always clear whether it is the endogenous or exogenous portion of cash that 
explainsthe market share growth. He uses asset tangibility and lagged cash levels to force 
the exogenous portion of cash to explain the market share growth. Furthermore, the quasi-
natural experiment of variation in industry-level import tariffs mitigates the concerns that 
product market performance drives observed cash levels. The results show that firms with 
more cash on hand perform significantly better when their industry experiences an 
exogenous intensification of product market competition. The effect of cash seems to be 
twice as good if a firm operates in competitive markets as opposed to concentrated 
markets. Fresard (2010) shows with import tariff changes that a firm with more cash on 
hand performs significantly better when its industry experiences an exogenous shock in 
product market competition. 
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In the following two subsections, I will review relevant  literature which has empirically 
studied firms with high cash holdings in order to find evidence of how the cash holdings 
are used. I will also present how the high cash holdings are supposed to impact on firm 
performance in the future. These factors might provide ideas regarding the channels that 
firms use in order to improve positions in the product markets through cash holdings.  
 
 Cash, performance and growth 2.3.1.
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) study the performance of firms holding persistent high cash 
levels. They also take a look at how firms, with more than 25 percent of their assets in 
cash, use their cash holdings. The results show that the investment expenditure of the 
firms with high cash levels is significantly higher than those of a comparison group 
(similar industry/SIC code and lower cash levels). The annual scaled investment 
expenditures are greater than in the comparison group of firms with temporary high cash 
holdings of the same size and industry. The median R&D expenditures are also higher for 
these firms what supports the arguments that high cash firms have higher growth 
opportunities and that assets do not support high levels of debt financing. In contrary to 
the results of Harford (1999) which suggests that high cash holdings lead to value-
decreasing acquisitions, the acquisition activity, according to Mikkelson and Partch 
(2003), is not that strong for firms holding persistently high cash levels. Nevertheless 
having high cash levels, not necessarily persistent high cash levels, at some point leads a 
firm to unusually high acquisition expenditure. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) conclude 
that high cash firms tend to use the cash holdings in asset growth although it does not lead 
to any unusual growth in sales.  
 
Fresard (2010) concludes his study with an estimation of how cash holdings affect firm 
value and its operational performance. Fresard (2010) focuses only on cash holdings 
impact on return on assets. His results show that relative-to-rivals cash holdings enhance 
operating performance. The estimate indicates that the effect on return on assets, 
measured as EBITDA per total assets, is significant.  
 
Harford (1999) studies corporate cash holdings and acquisition activity and suggests that 
more is spent on acquisitions when a firm has more excess cash. His underlying 
hypothesis is that the imperfections in the capital markets are costly enough for firms to 
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find it optimal to save for larger expenditures, e.g. acquisitions. Harford’s (1999) results 
suggest, in consistency with the free cash flow hypothesis, that the acquisition activity of 
these firms is nevertheless value decreasing. It is reflected in a negative stock price 
reaction following the acquisition announcement, and the performance of the combined 
firm is poor afterwards. This suggests that acquisition activity might not explain the 
improved product market performance. Harford (1999) focuses on the performance from 
the cash flow point of view so his study does not provide information on whether 
acquisitions improve the future market share development. Haushalter et al. (2007) 
suggest likewise that a firm’s investment behavior depends on its cash holdings. If firms 
have higher cash reserves and there is greater interdependence in their investment 
opportunities with rivals, they are more likely to increase investment when industry-level 
investment decreases. 
 
Opler et al. (1999) also studied the implications of cash holdings and concluded that the 
expenditure patterns of high excess cash firms do not indicate that the firms would use 
their excess cash quickly up. They find only little evidence of a short-run impact of excess 
cash on capital expenditures, acquisitions and payments to shareholders. This implies that 
a firm experiencing a large increase in excess cash rather keeps it than spends it on a 
short-term basis. According to Opler et al. (1999), the excess cash is used rather to cover 
losses than spent on new projects. The study seeks for patterns of spending for the firms 
with excess cash. Opler et al. (1999) find that the capital expenditure increases with the 
increase of excess cash for companies with both high and low market-to-book values, 
although the increase in the expenditure is smaller than the cash holdings increase for 
firms with high market-to-book value. Opler et al. (1999) conclude that even when the 
firms holding excess cash have only poor investment opportunities they still have higher 
capital expenditure and spend more on acquisitions.  
 
 Cash in product market competition 2.3.2.
Many studies of the impact of debt on product market behavior and the use of cash 
holdings relate to investments and to the ability for making acquisitions in different 
market conditions (see e.g. Haushalter et al. (2007), Froot, et al. (1993), Campello 
(2006)). In a situation of interdependent investment opportunities with competitors, 
independent financing choices that determine the exposure of investment opportunities 
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can be strategically beneficial (Campello, 2006). Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) also 
argue that firms which can finance investments with internal funds can try to gain market 
share by increasing investment when changes in industry conditions force rivals to 
underinvest.  
 
Baskin (1987) studies the oligopolistic model and the meaning of cash holdings in product 
market competition. In the model, liquid assets are “employed both to signal commitment 
to retaliate against market encroachment and to enable forms to rapidly preempt new 
opportunities”. He suggests two ways how liquidity can be advantageous in the markets: 
passive preemption and warfare. In the first, passive preemption, cash holdings enable a 
firm to respond quickly to new opportunities by constructing entry barriers and allow it to 
monopolize the market in a situation where an entrant is trying to create competition with 
investments into specialized assets. In order to preempt the competition, the first market 
holder will need to invest sunk costs to press the price level so low that the entrant has to 
exit the market. In the second strategy, warfare, cash holdings are used to back up the 
expected losses caused by the increased competition where the competitor’s cost-benefit 
calculus is changed with e.g. price decreases. Baskin (1987) concludes that liquid assets 
are important because of their ability to speed actions up in the competitive moves. 
 
Campello (2006) introduces potential policies to improve firm performance, such as 
capital outlays, research and development spending, plant or store location, improvements 
in distribution network, advertising targeted against rivals and the employment of more 
productive workers. As Campello (2006) concludes, the next step should be to identify the 
precise product market strategies where the cash holdings are used strategically with the 
knowledge of a firm’s and its rivals’ financial situation.  
 
2.4. Management view on cash balance 
The CEO of Stora Enso, Jouko Karvinen, states in the Annual Report 2009 that Stora 
Enso was able to face the challenges of the recent financial crisis in 2009 because they 
focused on cash flow, already before the year 2009 had started and the worst was coming. 
The firm managed to increase the cash flows by minimizing operational costs through 
effective working capital management and reduction of capital expenditure. The CEO of 
Danone, Franck Riboud, states in the company’s Annual Report 2009 that the cash target 
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for 2010 was going to be a 10% increase in the firm’s cash holdings. The purpose of the 
target remains unknown. “Due to the uncertain conditions on international capital markets, 
we increased our liquidity levels at the beginning of 2009”, is said in the Review of the 
Financial Year 2009 of BMW Group. These comments from the management reflect the 
fact that cash is a precautionary tool for facing the upcoming difficulties.  
 
Haushalter et al. (2007) refer to findings of Froot (1990) who reported the way Intel had 
defended its high cash balance. Intel’s top executives said that it was “an important 
competitive weapon and, because the economy was in a recession, that cash was king”. 
This corroborates the precautionary motive which seems to cause the behavior of the top 
management of large firms (see e.g. Lins et al. (2010)). The surveys of Graham and 
Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mittoo (2002) suggest that CFOs consider financial 
flexibility, i.e. having enough internal funds to finance future investments, the primary 
determinant of their policy decisions. 
 
Lins et al. (2010) find support for the precautionary motive of cash holdings from the 
management perspective. They study the determinants of cash holdings by conducting a 
survey on chief financial officers from 29 countries. Lins et al. (2010) ask whether firms 
use lines of credit or cash holdings to hedge against risks. The survey is mainly interested 
in non-operational cash holdings which are not observable in the financial statements. The 
results show that non-operational cash is held to protect against future cash flow shocks in 
bad times, while credit lines are held to give firms the option to exploit future business 
opportunities in good times. Excess cash is held for the purpose of insuring against future 
cash flow shortfalls. The study also reveals that less than half of the cash held on firm 
balance sheets are for non-operational purposes. This indicates that studies on high levels 
of cash holdings should try to construct models for examining the non-operational part of 
the holdings and the determinants for the operational need for cash.   
 
Campello et al. (2010) survey 1050 Chief Financial Officers in the US, Europe and Asia 
to examine how credit constraints affected firm spending behavior during the financial 
crisis in 2008. Interpretation of the results will naturally highlight the importance of cash 
holdings. The results show that over half of the CFOs confessed their firms had to 
postpone planned investment during the crisis. 86 percent of the CFOs said that their 
attractive investment opportunities were restricted during the time. Campello et al. (2010) 
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discover that financially constrained firms were forced to burn a sizable portion of their 
cash holdings during the crisis. The firms planned to cut more from investment, 
technology, marketing and employment, compared to unconstrained firms, during the 
crisis. Referring both to Campello et al. (2010) and Fresard (2010), one could assume that 
those unconstrained firms which hold more cash in a relation to the industry in the 
beginning of the crisis, would end up as the winners after the financial downturn.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
In this thesis, I expect to find evidence of the effect of cash holdings and industry-related 
market share growth. The aim is to explore whether there is a significant relation between 
a firm’s industry standardized cash holdings and its industry-related future market share 
increase. Fresard (2010) has shown that the evidence of this connection between cash 
holdings and product market outcomes is significant. I replicate Fresard (2010) by 
hypothesizing according to his results that this relation also applies with European data. I 
will study this with the following hypotheses. 
 
Firstly, I will test the underlying baseline relation of cash holdings and industry-related 
market share increase. The more a firm holds cash on its balance sheet, compared to the 
industry average cash ratios, the more the firm should create gains in market share, 
relative to other competitors in the industry. The cash holdings are examined in a relation 
to total assets.  
 
Hypothesis 1. High industry-related cash holdings lead to future industry-related market 
share growth. 
 
Second, I test whether the country of origin of a firm characterizes the cash holdings 
impact. Fresard’s (2010) study is completed with a sample of data from the Compustat 
tapes. The data describes firms originating in the US and leaves out the question whether 
the phenomenon could be related to any country-specific factors. My sample is 
constructed from European firms what gives me an opportunity to study whether there are 
differences between countries. I hypothesize that the cash holdings effect stated in 
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Hypothesis 1 holds true regardless of the firm’s country of origin. I test this with data 
from France, Germany and the UK. 
 
Hypothesis 2. High industry-related cash holdings lead to future industry-related market 
share growth regardless of a firm’s country of origin. 
 
To control whether the industry and cross industry specific factors affect the competitive 
effect of cash holdings, I follow Fresard (2010) and study what the effect of the 
competitors’ financial strength and the industry’s concentration is. I expect the decrease in 
a rival’s financial strength to yield more pronounced results for cash holdings. A similar 
impact should be visible when the competition toughens. I divide the sample into 
quartiles, first according to the competitors’ financial strength (Size, Age and Payout 
policy). Next, I test whether the industry conditions alter the effect of cash holdings; I will 
divide the sample according to the industry characteristics of Industry concentration 
(HHI) and Similarity of operations (defined with capital-labor ratio). I use these 
characteristics to measure how concentrated an industry is and how tight the competition 
is. The variables are explained in detail in Section 4. The following hypotheses depict the 
expectations. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1. The weaker the competitor’s financial status is the stronger is the impact 
of cash holdings on the industry-related market share growth. (Rival’s characteristics) 
 
Hypothesis 3.2. The higher the competition in an industry is the stronger is the impact of 
cash holdings on industry-related market share growth. (Industry characteristics) 
 
The definition of market share in Fresard’s (2010) study makes it doubtful of whether the 
sample, constructed for the study, describes the sales development in the sample industries 
well enough. The firms in Fresard’s (2010) study are both large and small firms which 
operate in different markets: some operate globally with European and Asian firms some 
only with other local and small players. Porter (1980) examines strategy formulation in 
global industries. He defines a global industry as one in which a firm’s strategic position 
in one country is affected by its position in other countries. In this study, I defined the 
markets according to industries; based on their 3- or 4- digit SIC codes (industry 
classification). I want to test whether this composition of industries misleads the results. 
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An error is possible as the data includes firms operating both in local and global markets. 
The division between globally and locally operating firms in my study is made referring to 
Korbin’s (1991) index of transnational integration of industries which describes the 
proportion of the intrafirm flows of international operations. The methodology of the 
subsample construction is explained in Section 4. 
 
Hypothesis 3.3. The cash holdings impact on future industry-related market share growth 
is stronger among industries operating globally than locally operating industries. 
 
If the effect of cash holdings stated in the first hypothesis applies the implications should 
have been strongly present in the recent financial crisis. Fresard (2010) concludes his 
study by arguing that his results should be applicable in this time period. He suggests that 
those companies that managed to increase their cash holdings before 2008 should have 
found a stronger position in the product markets after the crisis. Byoun and Xu (2011) 
indicate in their working paper that firms that relied on internal funding prior to the crisis 
have increased their market share compared to their competitors dependent on external 
finance during the crisis. I expect Hypothesis 1 to apply for the time period I am studying 
and that it provides stronger results for cash holdings impact. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Given the conditions in the recent financial crisis, the cash holdings effect 
on future industry-related market share growth is stronger than in a normal time period. 
 
4. Data  
The data is retrieved from the Thomson ONE Banker Worldscope financial data base and 
Datastream. The main variable figures are retrieved from Worldscope and the inflation 
rates by country from Datastream. The study concentrates on public companies and 
includes data of European firms which operate in manufacturing industries defined with 
SIC codes from 2000 to 3999
6
. The data is retrieved by country and comprises countries 
                                                          
6
 SIC codes are created by the US government and meant to describe homogenous markets. The US Securities 
and Exchange Commission defines the SIC codes in the following link 
http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm. The codes are specified with four digits describing specified 
industries and production. See Clarke’s (1989) study of how well the SIC codes identify firms with similar 
characteristic variables. 
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which are members of the European Union and/or the European Economic Area, 22 
countries, altogether (see Appendix I). The firms are both active and non-active public 
companies. The data consist of observations from a time period of 1990 to 2009. 
 
4.1. Sample construction 
To construct the data, I first retrieve all active and non-active firms from all the 22 
European countries. I then restrict the sample to include only those firms which operate in 
a manufacturing industry specified with a primary SIC code between 2000 and 3999. The 
primary SIC codes are appointed by Thomson One Banker to best describe the firm’s 
group operations. If a firm is lacking the primary SIC code I exclude it from the sample. 
This leaves me with 4029 European firms. As most of the variables in the analysis are 
relative to total assets, I exclude all the firms which lack figures for total assets in the total 
time period from 1990 to 2009. In addition, all firms lacking figures for cash and sales are 
excluded. The figures are retrieved in euros from the data base and adjusted with inflation  
 
Table I 
Definition of Variables and Data Items 
Table I describes the data items in Worldscope used to create the variables and for the analysis of the cash 
holdings effect. The variables are stated in the left hand column, their description in the middle and the 
Worldscope data item on the right hand column. All the variables are constructed from P/L, Balance Sheet 
or Cash Flow statements. 
 
Variable Description Data item in Worldscope
Total Assets Total Assets TotalAssets
Sales Sales Sales
Size Natural logarithm of Total Assets, ln(TotalAssets) TotalAssets
∆MarketShare (Sales t-Sales t-1)/Sales t-1 minus industry-year 
average sales increase
Sales
Cash (Cash + Short-Term Investments)/Total Assets CashAndSTInvestments
Leverage (Long-Term Debt + Current Portion of LT Debt) / 
Total Assets
TotalLTDebt+ CurrentPortionOfLTDebt
Tangibility 0,715*Receivables + 0,547*Inventories + 
0,535*Fixed Capital
TotalReceivables,TotalInventories, 
TotalPropPlantEquipNet
Acquisitions Amount spend in acquisitions(cash)/ Total Assets NetAssetsFrAcquisitionsCFStmt
Market-to-Book Market value of equity + book value of assets - 
book value of equity - deferred taxes / total assets
CommonSharesOutstanding*PriceFYE, 
TotalAssets, TotalCommonEquity, 
DeferredTaxesBalSht
Age Nbr. of years preceeding the observation year 
when the firm has a stock price in the Worldscope.
PriceFYE
Payout ratio Paid dividends/net income DividendPayout, 
TotalPropPlantEquipGrossCapital-labor ratio TotalPropPlantEquipGross/Employees Employees, TotalPropPlantEquipGross
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to equate the 1995 price level. The inflation adjustment is made with country specific 
Consumer Price Indexes and the indexes are retrieved from the Datastream. 
 
In Table I, I describe the Worldscope definitions for the data items used in the analysis to 
compute the dependent and independent variables. The calculation of the dependent and 
independent variables is explained in the Section 4.2.1., including the variables in Table I. 
I organize the sample by industry according to the Primary SIC codes, in order to study 
the competitive aspect of cash holdings in relation to industry characteristics. The SIC 
codes describe the industries with 4-digit specifications. I define the industries for my 
sample according to 3- and 4- digits. At this point, there must be at least three firms per 
industry. If there is less the firms are classified according to the industry in which their 
biggest segment operates or according to a more general industry specification (less 
significant digits in the SIC code). If there are more than one hundred firms in one 
industry according to 3 digits I divide the industry into smaller industries according to 4 
digits and apply the procedure described above to allocate all firms into an industry. This 
industry classification gives me 151 industries with specification of 3- or 4-digits, with a 
minimum of three firms per industry, 26 firms per industry, on average. 
 
I apply observation criteria to sales, assets, debt, cash and book values of equity to analyze 
a coherent sample. Following Fresard’s (2010) way of constructing his sample I exclude 
firm-years where the sales or assets are less than one million euros. These small firms 
usually face extensive asset and sales increase or decrease that might bias the results. 
Leaving these firms out decreases the selection bias because smaller firms in the 
beginning of their life span can increase their operations with an abnormal speed or they 
operate in a smaller geographical area where they compete only with local markets. I also 
exclude observations with debt and cash ratios over one and negative book values of 
equity. After this specification I am left with 149 industries, with a minimum of three 
firms per industry, 25 firms per industry, on average. Excluding all the extreme 
observations, according to the criteria described above, leaves me 3770 firms. 
 
4.2. Summary statistics of data 
In this section, I describe the characteristics of my sample data and the variables I use to 
study the cash holdings impact on market share growth. Table II summarizes the 
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observations of the main sample. It forms a panel data that is created from 3770 firms 
before any observation winsorizing, but includes all the other criteria set for the sample 
during the sample construction. The sample is clearly smaller compared to Fresard’s 
(2010) study of US data. The amount of observations of Acquisitions and Leverage 
especially is clearly smaller. These observations reduce the amount of firm-year 
observations in the final analysis of the empirical relation. The sample deviates in some 
statistics from Fresard’s (2010) US data. The average sales growth (0.06) and cash levels 
(0.12) in my sample are lower than in Fresard (2010) (0.14 and 0.19, respectively). The 
firms in my European sample are clearly more leveraged, with an average value of 0.19 
(0.14, respectively). The amount of net cash flow spend in acquisitions to total assets 
follows a similar level in both samples, being 0.06 in both studies. The average of assets 
in European firms seems to be higher than in the US sample. My median assets are 100 
million euros compared to Fresard’s (2010) assets of 59 million dollars, on average. 
Table II 
Summary Statistics of the Sample 
Table II describes the summary statistics of the main features of the sample including 3770 firms from 22 
European countries. The data items follow the criteria set in the sample construction. Total Assets and Sales 
are a minimum of one million euros in a firm-year, and Sales growth includes observations with growth less 
than 200%. Leverage and Cash are restricted to less than one. The sample period is from 1990 to 2009, and 
the sales growth observations begin in 1991. The sample consists of firms in manufacturing industries 
defined with 3- or 4-digit SIC codes from 2000 to 3999. 
 
 
My focus in this thesis is to analyze the cash holdings impact on market share growth also 
during the recent financial crisis. In Table III, I present the cash levels and sales growth 
figures for the industries included in the study (with a 2-digit specification) for three 
different time periods, from 1990 to 1999, from 2000 to 2009 and the financial crisis, 
from 2008 to 2009. My sample statistics in Table III are in line with the findings of Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2009) who report that US industrial firms have increased their cash 
levels during the last two decades. In my European sample, the average increase in cash  
Nbr. Of 
Observation Average
25th 
percentile Median
75th 
percentile St.dev
Total Assets (€Millions) 39,753 1 361 30 100 405 7 610
Cash 38,077 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.15
Sales Growth 34,787 0.06 -0.07 0.03 0.15 0.28
Leverage 13,616 0.19 0.07 0.16 0.28 0.28
Acquisitions 9,479 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.12
Market-to-Book 36,020 6.92 1.04 1.36 2.34 65.71
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Table III 
Industry Statistics of the Sample 
Table III presents summary statistics of Cash and Sales growth for three different time periods, from 1990 to 
1999, from 2000 to 2009 and from 2008 to 2009. All the figures are average values. Sales are a minimum of 
one million euros in a firm-year and Sales growth includes observations with growth less than 200%. Cash 
is restricted to less than one. The sample period is from 1990 to 2009 and the sales growth observations 
begin in 1991. The sample consists of firms in manufacturing industries defined with 3- or 4-digit SIC codes 
from 2000 to 3999. The number of observations is in parentheses below each figure. 
 
 
Industry
1990-
1999
2000-
2009
2008-
2009
1991-
1999
2000-
2009
2008-
2009
2000  Food and Kindred Products 0.10   
(2,081)
0.09 
(2,233)
0.08   
(436)
0.05   
(1,846)
0.05   
(2,201)
0.00    
(446)
2100 Tobacco Products 0.20       
(48)
0.19       
(66) 
0.18       
(14) 
0.06       
(39) 
0.05       
(59)
0.11       
(12)
2200 Textile Mill Products 0.08     
(790)
0.07    
(607)
0.08    
(106)
0.01    
(700)
-0.05    
(594)
-0.18    
(102)
2300 Apparel and Other Finished Products Made 
from Fabrics
0.11     
(586)
0.12    
(628)
0.12    
(110)
0.05    
(491)
0.04    
(610)
-0.03    
(105)
2400  Lumber and Wood Products (no Furniture) 0.09    
(286)
0.08    
(379)
0.07    
(74)
0.08    
(244)
0.07    
(361)
-0.06      
(72)
2500 Furniture and Fixtures 0.10    
(343)
0.11    
(315)
0.11    
(62)
0.09    
(290)
0.02    
(314)
-0.09     
(60)
2600 Papers and Allied Products 0.09    
(755)
0.08    
(724)
0.07   
(143)
0.07    
(655)
0.02    
(694)
-0.06    
(137)
2700 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 0.13    
(925)
0.13   
(1,125)
0.12   
(207)
0.09    
(799)
0.04   
(1,115)
-0.06   
(223)
2800 Chemicals and Allied Products 0.15 
(1,780)
0.18 
(2,487)
0.17   
(501)
0.08   
(1,527)
0.08   
(2,276)
0.02     
(496)
2900 Petroleum Refining and Related Products 0.06    
(201)
0.09    
(209)
0.12     
(43)
0.03    
(175)
0.13     
(192)
0.03       
(43)
3000 Rubber and Miscellanious Plastic Products 0.11     
(529)
0.10    
(505)
0.09    
(95)
0.06    
(457)
0.05    
(482)
-0.06      
(99)
3100 Leather and Leather Products 0.15    
(116)
0.13    
(115)
0.14    
(25)
0.01      
(99)
0.06    
(112)
0.06      
(25)
3200 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 0.11    
(1,093)
0.08    
(845)
0.08    
(141)
0.04    
(960)
0.03    
(834)
-0.07    
(141)
3300 Primary Metal Industries 0.07    
(928)
0.08     
(849)
0.09     
(164)
0.05    
(793)
0.05    
(822)
-0.16    
(164)
3400 Fabricated Metal Products, Except 
Machinery and Transport Equipment
0.10    
(864)
0.13    
(774)
0.13    
(161)
0.03    
(766)
0.05    
(722)
0.00    
(145)
3500 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment
0.13    
(2,233)
0.14  
(2,836)
0.15  
(547)
0.08   
(1,921)
0.07    
(2,673)
-0.04    
(543)
3600 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment 
and Components, except Computer
0.13   
(1,650)
0.17   
(2,596)
0.16   
(528)
0.11   
(1416)
0.08 
(2,513)
-0.03   
(531)
3700 Transportation Equipment 0.11   
(1,064)
0.11   
(1,093)
0.10   
(220)
0.08    
(927)
0.07   
(1,020)
-0.06   
(213)
3800 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling 
Instruments; Photographic, Medical etc.
0.15  
(1,012)
0.18  
(1,615)
0.15  
(312)
0.12    
(844)
0.10   
(1,546)
0.04     
(323)
3900 Miscellanious Manufacturing Industries 0.12     
(332)
0.12    
(439)
0.13    
(85)
0.08     
(282)
0.05     
(417)
-0.02     
(80)
Total sample 0.11 
(17,616)
0.13   
(20,461)
0.13   
(3,974)
0.07   
(15,230)
0.06  
(19,557)
-0.03  
(3,963)
Cash to Total Assets Sales Growth
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holdings between the two observed decades was 13%. In most of the observed industries, 
the cash holdings were lower during the recent financial crisis compared to the average 
during 2000 to 2009. Industries requiring heavy investments, especially such as wood, 
paper, printing, chemicals, rubber, electronics and measuring, and analyzing and 
controlling equipment, have suffered from declining cash piles.  
 
Most of the industries that lost cash during the crisis suffered most also in terms of sales 
figures. The average sales growth in my sample for the years 2008 and 2009 was -0.03. 
The average sales increase in my sample in a slightly longer period during the recession, 
from 2007 to 2009, was only 0.002. The strongest fall in sales took place after the year 
end of 2007. Therefore, my focus on analyzing the financial crisis is the cash holdings 
impact on market share growth occurring from January 2008 to December 2009.  
5. Research methods 
In this section, I describe how the dependent and independent variables are constructed. I 
focus especially on the instrumental variable approach which is used to tackle the reversal 
causality potentially captured in the link between cash holdings and market share growth. 
I review the methods to analyze the impact of rival and industry characteristics on the 
empirical relation of cash holdings and market share growth. In the end, I summarize the 
statistics for the dependent and independent variables and present the regression model for 
the analysis.
7
 
 
5.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, ∆MarketShare, describes the industry-related market share 
change. As the size of a certain market or industry, measured in sales, is not known I 
study how the market share of a firm changes in relation to average sales increase of its 
industry. I expect to find a relation between the relative to rivals cash holdings and the 
relative to industry market share change. As the market share change cannot be measured 
I measure instead the change of a firm’s sales between two sequential firm-years 
compared to the average change between the corresponding two sequential industry-years. 
At this point, when I form the variables, I require at least five firms per an industry-year to 
                                                          
7
 The data has been analyzed and studied with Microsoft Excel 2007 and EViews7. 
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create an industry, and to avoid unnecessary noise in standard deviations that might bias 
values for the dependent variables. I also run my baseline estimation (specified in Section 
5.6.) with a minimum of 15 firms per industry for result comparison purposes. 
 
The following equation describes the methodology used to calculate the dependent 
variable ∆MarketShare:  
 
                
                    
        
 
                   
        
   (1) 
 
where i=1,..n denotes the observed firm, t=1,..n the time and k=1,..n the observed 
industry. Salesi,t is the total sales of a firm i in a year t, and Salesk,t the total sales of an 
industry k (defined with 3- or 4-digit SIC codes) in a year t. 
 
Even after applying different criteria for the sample, described in Section 4.1., the 
variables such as ∆MarketShare, might still include extreme values of outliers which 
impact the results heavily. I revalue those extreme values which lie outside the range of 
99% of the observations by winzorizing them. Instead of excluding the figures I revalue 
them with the values of the end of the 99% range of the observations; this means that all 
the observations which lie outside the range are given the exact value of the end of the 
99% range. This procedure minimizes the outliers to create noise to the variables and 
research results. I apply winsorizing to the dependent and independent variables for the 
basic estimation (see Section 5.6) of cash holdings impact on future market share growth 
to get more reliable results. 
 
5.2. Cash holdings 
 Instrumental variable (IV) approach 5.2.1.
The causal link between cash holdings and market share might be biased due to 
endogeneity factors. An independent variable, Cash, might be correlated with an error 
term in my regression model. Reversal causality might also exist, e.g. the level of cash 
holdings on the balance sheet might be driven by the market share position of a firm in an 
industry. There might also exist other external factors driving the cash levels, such as 
collateral demands from the debt providers and managerial preferences which up to a 
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certain level might not have anything to do with a firm’s cash levels or the strategic use of 
cash holdings. Because these kind of factors are not observable in the study and cannot be 
controlled I have to tackle them with econometric methods. 
 
In my study any controlled experiments to tackle endogeneity bias are difficult to run, so 
there must be another way to control them. Following Fresard (2010), I use the 
instrumental variable (IV) approach to enforce the exogenous portion of cash, the actual 
cash holdings which are not driven from any unobserved error term, to explain the 
improvement in the product markets. In the instrumental variable approach, the cash 
holdings are estimated with instruments that correlate with the original explanatory 
variable and that do not suffer from the same endogeneity bias. I apply Fresard’s (2010) 
estimation and use asset tangibility (Tangibility) and two lagged values of cash holdings 
(Casht-1 and Casht-2) to instrument the cash holdings. The specification follows Berger et 
al (1996), and it is a multiple regression model estimating coefficients for the different 
instruments. I use the estimated coefficients to calculate the final z-scored cash holdings 
for the final regression. I allow firm (αi) and time (ηt) fixed effects in the instrumental 
variable approach. The instrumented cash holdings are estimated with the following 
equation: 
 
                                                                       (2) 
 
where Tangibility is defined with receivables, inventories and fixed capital) as described 
in Table I. The estimation of Tangibility follows Berger et al. (1996) who estimated the 
coefficient for the variables in order to find the relations between book value and exit 
value for the major asset classes when operations are discontinued. These coefficients 
provide the tangibility of these assets if they were to be liquidated. The Tangibility is 
defined with following factors; 0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventories + 0.535*Fixed 
Capital. 
 
My instruments apply reasonably well to explain the cash holdings. The coefficients for 
the instruments are presented in Table V with the regression results of the instrumented 
cash holdings and market share growth.  
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 Z-scored cash holdings 5.2.2.
I study the instrumented cash holdings relative to rivals to depict the competitive effect of 
cash holdings. The competitive edge is determined in relation to the industry’s cash 
holdings. I expect the competitive advantage to appear when a firm which has cash 
holdings outside the standard deviation of the industry’s cash holdings can increase its 
market share (Fresard (2010)). If a firm has higher cash holdings than the industry on 
average its competitive advantage might not unfold if the cash holdings are still within the 
standard deviation of the industry cash holdings. 
 
I standardize (z-score) the instrumented cash holdings so than I can examine the relation 
between the relative to rivals cash holdings and the industry-related cash holdings. I 
follow MacKey and Phillips (2005) and Fresard (2010) in this standardization. I deduct 
the average cash holdings of the industry, IVCashk,t, from the firm’s instrumented cash 
holdings, IVCashi,t. I then divide the margin with the standard deviation of the industry 
cash holdings, σIVCashk,t. The industries are defined with the 3- or 4-digit SIC codes and 
the industry averages and standard deviations calculated for each industry-year. The 
following equation defines the method explained for standardizing the cash holdings:  
 
         
                   
          
     (3) 
 
where k=1,2..n denotes the industry, i=1,2..n the firm and t=1,2..n the year. In every year 
there must be at least five firms to create an industry in order to control the noise in the 
standard deviations.  
 
5.3. Control variables 
In the first set of control variables, I study whether adding Size, Leverage or past market 
share changes, ∆MarketShare, change the cash holdings impact on market share growth. 
Size is denoted as the natural logarithm of total assets and Leverage as the long-term plus 
the current portion of the long-term debt. The past market share changes are defined 
according to the method for the dependent variable. The definitions are presented in Table 
I (Section 4.1.) with other data definitions. 
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With the additional control variables I measure whether Acquisitions or Market-to-Book 
ratios change the setting with the cash holdings on market share growth. The acquisitions 
are defined as the net assets from acquisition in the cash flow statement scaled by total 
assets. Acquisitions can be a way to expand a firm’s operations and improve performance 
(see e.g. Healy, Palepu and Ruback, (1992)). I want to test whether acquisitions diminish 
the impact of cash holdings when I control the regression with the net amount spent in 
acquisitions in the two previous years. Market-to-Book ratio indicates the expectations set 
for a firm by the financial markets. The variable is constructed by adding the book value 
of assets to the market value of equity and deducting the book value of equity and 
deferred taxes. To get the ratio, I divide the market value of assets with the book value of 
total assets. If the investors’ expectations set in a share price, and accordingly in the 
market-to-book ratio, are correct and indicate future growth and improvement the control 
variable should have a positive coefficient and indicate future market share growth. The 
definitions of Acquisitions and Market-to-Book are also presented in Table I (Section 4.1). 
 
5.4. Industry characteristics 
In this section, I describe the methods I use to study whether the cash holdings impact on 
future market share growth depends on the industry characteristics, from financial strength 
of rivals or competitive nature of the industry. In all the examinations I use subsamples to 
study whether there are differences in the impact of cash holdings. 
 
I use firm Size, Age and Payout policy to describe the financial strength of rivals. The 
three definitions measure how strong financial constraints the firms in the industry have. 
Size corresponds to the natural logarithm of total assets as before. Age is defined by the 
preceding continuous firm-years before the firm has a year-end share price in the 
Thomson One Banker Worldscope database. Payout policy is defined as the payout ratio. I 
sort the total sample into subsamples of the first and fourth quartiles based on these 
characteristics and their magnitude. I run the baseline estimation for all the subsamples to 
test whether the impact of cash holdings differs between them.  
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I analyze the effect of the industry competition (concentration) with similar methods as 
with the rival characteristics. I create subsamples according to the industry competition 
(concentration) defined by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
8
 and the Similarity of 
operations specified with the capital-labor ratio. I calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index for every industry k for every year t with the following equation; 
 
        ∑  
        
∑         
 
   
          (4) 
 
For a year t, the firm-year sales are divided by the total sales of an industry and the 
remainder is squared. The sum of the squares describes the concentration of the industry. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index classifies industries with indexes higher than 0.18 as 
highly concentrated and those with an index lower than 0.10 as competitive. Fresard 
(2010) also uses the guidelines given by the Department of Justice of the US and forms 
the subsamples according to the limits. My total sample is constructed from highly 
concentrated industries: for the total sample the median Herfindahl-Hirschman index is 
0.33 and the average figure 0.41 (see Table IV). Because the sample is so strongly 
concentrated in all industries I do not create subsamples with the limits of 0.10 and 0.18. 
Instead, I use the first and fourth quartiles of the industries which are ranked based on the 
index, to create the subsamples. 
 
Forming the subsamples by the Similarity of operations I follow Fresard’s (2010) setting. 
I rank the industries according to their Similarity of operations measured by the capital-
labor ratio. The Similarity of operations describes how similar the industries are in terms 
of technological structure. If the capital-labor ratios of the firms in an industry are close to 
each other, i.e. firms organize their operations in a similar way, the competition is harder. 
The proxy value for the similarity is low when the difference between firms is small. I 
divide a firm’s Fixed capital by the number of Employees multiplied by thousand and 
deduct the median industry-year capital labor ratio from each firm’s value. I then divide 
the difference by the range of maximum and minimum value in the industry to make the 
values comparable across industries. The following equations summarize the methods: 
                                                          
8
 Herfindahl-Hirschman index named by economists by Orris C. Herfindahl and Albert O. Hirschman is widely 
used to assess the level of competition. It is used e.g. in the European Union to assess competition situation 
changes in the product markets due to mergers and acquisitions. 
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   (5), 
 
                             
                                             
                                                   
 (6) 
 
The smaller the proxy for the similarity is the more similar are the operations in the 
industry. I expect the similarity to reflect competition in the industry and to indicate a 
higher probability of losing market share (Fresard (2010)). Cash holdings should show 
more pronounced results in this subsample than in the subsample where the competition is 
minimal. 
 
5.5. Summary statistics of variables 
Table IV 
Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Table IV presents summary statistics for the variables used in the baseline estimation presented in Section 
5.6., and for the analysis of industry characteristics. The observations are firm-year observations, except for 
Industry concentration (HHI) and Similarity of operations which are industry-year observations. 
∆MarketShare and zCash are computed with a minimum of five firm-year observations in each industry-
year. The sample period is from 1990 to 2009, ∆MarketShare figures begin in 1991 and zCash figures in 
1992. The sample consists of firms in industries defined with 3- or 4-digit SIC codes from 2000 to 3999.  
 
 
Table IV summarizes the main statistics for the dependent and independent variables, in 
addition to the sample criteria for the industry characteristics. Size and Leverage are 
presented already in Table II. The observations are firm-year observations except the 
Variables
Nbr. Of 
Observation Average
25th 
percentile Median
75th 
percentile St.dev.
∆MarketShare 34 787 0.00 -0.12 -0.02 0.08 0.26
Tangibility 39 753 0.36 0.25 0.38 0.49 0.15
zCash 26 798 0.00 -0.70 -0.33 0.57 0.97
Acquisitions 9 479 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.12
Market-to-Book 36 020 6.92 1.04 1.36 2.34 65.71
Age 37 636 6.98 0.00 0.00 6.00 4.71
Payout ratio 19 634 0.35 0.20 0.31 0.47 0.22
HH Index 2 917 0.41 0.24 0.33 0.54 0.26
Similarity of operations 2 858 0.67 0.55 0.71 0.83 0.23
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Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and Similarity of operations which are industry-year 
observations.  
 
5.6. Regression model 
The main focus of this thesis is to examine whether there is an empirical relation between 
the lagged, relative to rivals cash holdings and future industry-related market share 
growth. I follow Fresard (2010) and form a regression model to empirically test the 
baseline estimation and the previously presented hypotheses: 
 
                          (          )    
            (7), 
 
where i and t represent the firm and the year, respectively. The change in the market share, 
∆MarketShare, is estimated in relation to the industry sales increase, as described in 
Section 5.1. The market share changes thus represent the industry-related market share 
changes where the market is constructed from firms operating in the same industry, 
defined with 3- or 4-digit SIC codes. The firm’s cash holdings, zCash, are assessed with 
the instrumental variable (IV) approach and standardized with the industry standard 
deviations. The main attention in my study is on ν, the coefficient for the standardized 
cash holdings. Xi represents different control variables which capture other direct sources 
of product market performance and market share growth, such as Size, Leverage and past 
market share growth, ∆MarketShare. Additional control variables are Acquisition 
spending and Market-to-book ratio. 
 
What makes the regression analysis and the sample challenging are the unobserved 
variables and error terms which might correlate with the explanatory variables included, 
in addition to the cash holdings, and impact the dependent variable. This makes it difficult 
to employ a simple regression model, such as the OLS (Ordinary least square method). To 
analyze my sample, which is in a panel data form, I use a fixed effects model. The fixed 
effects model can be used when one cannot expect there is no unobserved time- or cross-
section (firm) specific variables or any error terms which might correlate with the used 
explanatory variables (zCash or other control variables).  
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The error terms in the regression model might encapsulate all the unobserved variables 
which are cross-section specific and not changing over time. There might be country, 
industry or legislation specific effects that impact the observed firm. To estimate the 
cross-section specific effects, dummy variables can be used with a least squares dummy 
variable (LSVD) method. As it is not practical to write down all the dummy variables for 
every firm in the regression model they are written in the equation as one unobserved 
variable changing by a firm, αi, but not over time. This allows the intercept to change 
according to the cross-section. One has to eliminate the intercept though, so as to avoid a 
dummy variable trap due to the sum of dummies being one in every observation. Also the 
dummy variables cannot be solved due to multicollinearity. As the time period of my 
sample is long and it includes changes in the economic environment I allow time fixed 
effects, as well. The method for the time fixed effects is the same as with the firm fixed 
effects and for the sake of convenience I note the change in the intercept due to time with 
ηt. 
 
6. Empirical results 
My empirical findings are reviewed in this section. In section 6.1., I first present the 
results for the cash holdings impact on market share growth for the baseline estimation of 
the total sample. I then run the analysis focusing on three countries, namely France, 
Germany and the UK, to depict the differences between these countries. Next, I examine 
how industry characteristics change the cash holdings impact. The latter part, Section 6.2., 
reviews the findings of the cash holdings for the time period of the recent financial crisis, 
2008-2009. 
 
6.1. Cash holdings effect on market share growth 
 Baseline estimation 6.1.1.
This part of the empirical results is the core study of the thesis. I test the instrumented 
cash holdings effect on future market share growth (Hypothesis 1). The results are shown 
in Table V where the coefficients for the cash holdings are presented. Due to the 
endogeneity bias I use the instrumental variable approach to elicit the exogeneous part of 
the cash holdings impact on future industry-related market share growth. This reduces the 
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potential bias of reversal causality between market share increase and cash holdings, and 
any potential impact of error terms in the regression model to market share growth. In the 
instrumental variable approach, I explain the cash holdings with Tangibility and lagged 
cash ratios from the two previous financial years (see Fresard (2010) and Berger, Ofek 
and Swary (1996)). Tangibility defines cash holdings but does not impact market share 
growth directly. I allow the firm and time period effects and use the cash instruments to 
construct the cash holdings for the regression model (7). 
 
The specification (2) for the instrumented cash holdings yields significant coefficients for 
Tangibility and one-year-lagged cash holdings. The explanation power of the estimation is 
0.771. The coefficients of the instruments are presented on the right hand side in Table V. 
Like Fresard (2010) in his estimation, I, too, find a negative relation between Tangibility 
(-0-295) and a positive one with one-year lagged Cash values (0.398). The two-year 
lagged cash holdings do not give a statistically significant explanation for the current cash 
ratios. In the regression I allow cross-section (firm) and time fixed effects to explain the 
cash ratios. Using the resulting specification I produce the instrumented cash holdings 
variables for every firm in every time period, including the firm and period effects, 
respectively.  
 
The instrumented cash holdings are used to standardize the cash holdings to bring the 
industry-related competitive edge of the cash holdings into effect. What motivates the 
standardization is to find out whether those firms that have higher cash ratios than the 
industry on average and that are not in the dispersion of the industry cash ratios have a 
competitive advantage. I am most interested in those firms that not only have high cash 
ratios compared to their average peers in the industry but also have a competitive edge of 
cash ratios being outside the standard deviation of the industry’s cash ratios. Every 
industry standard deviation must be comprised of at least five firm-year observations so 
that the analysis is coherent and biased deviations can be avoided.  
 
The results seem to indicate that the cash holdings effect presented in Fresard’s (2010) 
study does not hold worldwide. My data suggests that there is no significant relation 
between the relative to rivals cash holdings and the future industry-related market share 
growth. In contrast to Fresard’s (2010) positive and significant connection between the 
variables, I propose that if there is any relation between them it is negative for the one-.
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Table V 
The Impact of Cash Holdings on Future Market Share Growth 
Table V describes the baseline estimation of the cash holdings impact on industry-related market share growth. The dependent variable, ∆MarketShare, is the industry-
related market share change. The main independent variable, zCash, is instrumented to avoid circular causality between cash holdings and market share changes, and 
standardized to reflect the competitiveness compared to the industry. The coefficients for the instruments are presented in Column 6. The baseline estimation is presented 
in columns 1, 2 and 3. In columns 4 and 5 the estimation is run with a minimum of 15 firm-year observations per industry for robust purposes. The table presents other 
control variables such as Size, past Leverage and past ∆MarketShare. The firm- and time-fixed effects are allowed. The time period is from 1990 to 2009. I denote 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level with ***, ** and *, respectively. The t-statistics are presented in brackets under the coefficients. 
 No. Of Firms 
>15 
 No. Of Firms 
>15 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
zCash t-1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 Tangibility t -0.295***
[-1.198] [-1.220] [-0.502] [-51.913]
zCash t-2 0.003 0.004 0.005 Cash t-1 0.398***
[1.055] [1.429] [1.019] [69.884]
Size t-1 -0.081*** -0.001 -0.074*** -0.084*** -0.094*** Cash t-2 -0.005
[-8.786] [-0.575] [-7.486] [-5.677] [-5.891] [-0.951]
Leverage t-1 0.092** 0.078** 0.083** 0.098 0.151**
[2.371] [2.014] [2.130] [1.599] [2.328]
Leverage t-2 -0.063* -0.108*** -0.056 -0.074 -0.121*
[-1.664] [-2.783] [-1.457] [-1.227] [-1.858]
∆MarketShare t-1 -0.003 0.183*** -0.008 -0.029 -0.022
[-0.252] [13.768] [-0.600] [-1.433] [-1.026]
∆MarketShare t-2 -0.101*** 0.041*** -0.100*** -0.108*** -0.098***
[-7.974] [3.200] [-7.615] [-5.489] [-4.724]
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Of Obs. 7,084 6,686 6,469 3,221 2,946 30,383
R
2
0.361 0.262 0.358 0.393 0.378 0.771
J- statistic (p-value)
IV cash holdings effect Cash instruments
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year lagged cash holdings and positive for the two-year lagged figures. Thus, the 
coefficients for one- and two-year lagged cash holdings differ in signs. Both of them are 
still insignificant. The robust check with a minimum of 15 firm-year observations per 
industry each year supports the original results of columns (1) to (3) in Table V. The 
negative and insignificant coefficient for the one-year lagged cash holdings and the 
opposite effect from the two-year lagged cash holdings both hold. 
 
My results seem to suggest, thus far, that there is no significant evidence for or against the 
hypothesis that relative to rival cash holdings impact the industry-related market share 
growth. My findings are not significant but they indicate that the potential positive impact 
of cash holdings to future industry-related market share growth derives from the two-year 
lagged cash holdings. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) propose that high cash firms tend to 
use their cash holdings in asset growth. However, this does not lead to any unusual growth 
in sales in the subsequent year. This could suggest that the actual impact of high cash 
holdings cannot be seen directly in the following financial year; instead the benefit of the 
use of the relative to rivals cash holdings is seen further in the future. Thus, the results are 
not suggesting any holding evidence for or against the hypothesis of cash holdings impact 
(Hypothesis 1). At this point, the Hypothesis 1 cannot be accepted or rejected, but the 
two-year lagged cash holdings are worth to focus on, based on the current findings. 
 
Contrary to Fresard’s (2010) results, I report partly opposite coefficients for the control 
variables. Even though I use the same control variables as Fresard (2010) in his 
estimations, the results are surprising. The effect of firm Size on future market share 
growth is negative on one percent significance level, -0.081 in Table V. The result holds 
with the sample of a minimum of 15 observations for industry averages and deviations for 
robust purposes. My interpretation is that it is more challenging for larger firms to 
improve their market shares than for smaller firms. The growth potential is logically larger 
for smaller firms entering markets. Smaller firms either increase their market share rapidly 
in order to gain a footing in the competition or they lose their grip of the market entrance 
and fall. It is more difficult for larger and more stable firms to suddenly change their 
market position. They would need acquisitions or other investments to enlarge operations. 
If an economical shock that changes the business environment took place the impact of 
firm Size would be more blurred. I will focus on this in Section 6.2. where the recent 
financial crisis will be studied. 
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Besides the size effect the one-year-lagged debt ratio, Leveraget-1, also turns out to have a 
significant impact on future industry-related market share growth. In column (1) of Table 
V, I report that one-year lagged Leverage increases the future industry-related market 
share. The one-year-lagged Leverage has a positive coefficient of 0.092 which is 
significant at one percent significance level. The positive impact, either significant or not, 
holds for all the estimations in Table V. Fresard (2010) reports similar results of the 
positive impact of Leveraget-1, and significantly negative ones for Leveraget-2. My 
findings support this setting as I report a negative impact of two-year lagged Leverage in 
all the estimations. The coefficients are significant in columns (1) to (3). The results are in 
line with Campello (2006) who finds positive implications of moderate debt taking for 
industry-related market share growth. However, he suggests that the debt has a threshold 
and its effect turns negative after passing this threshold. Campello’s (2006), Fresard’s 
(2010) and my results support Jensen (1989) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) who 
suggest that debt disciplines the management to improve firm performance and realize 
value enhancing operations.  
 
My results seem to indicate inconsistent results for the impact of past ∆Market Share on 
future market share growth: they are both for and against it. Fresard (2010) reports a 
positive impact of one-year past market share improvement and a negative one for two-
year past figures. My findings are partly in line with his. I find both positive and negative 
results for one-year past market share; all the coefficients for the two-year past figures are 
significant. In columns (1) and (3) to (5) in Table V, the two year past market share 
explains the future market share development negatively at one percent significance level. 
In the estimation of column (2), the result is contradictory and significantly positive. 
Based on these findings, it is difficult to draw conclusions on the real nature of past 
market shares in the development of the future ones. 
 
The two-year lagged cash holdings show positive but not significant results in Table V. I 
run the baseline estimation again for the two-year lagged cash holdings with additional 
control variables (Table VI). My primary interest is whether the results for cash holdings 
in Table V remain similar in Table VI when I include Acquisitions and Market-to-Book 
ratio to control the changes in future market share growth.  
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Table VI 
The Impact of Cash Holdings on Future Market Share Growth 
With Additional Control Variables 
Table VI describes the baseline estimation of the cash holdings impact on industry-related market share 
growth with additional control variables. The dependent variable, ∆MarketShare, is the industry-related 
market share change. The main independent variable, zCash, is instrumented and standardized as in Table 
V. In columns 1 and 2, the baseline estimation is presented with zCasht-2 and additional control variables, 
Acquisitions and Market-to-Book. In columns 4 and 5, the estimations are run with a minimum of 15 firm-
year observations per industry for robust purposes. The firm- and time-fixed effects are allowed. The time 
period is from 1990 to 2009. I denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level with ***, ** and *, respectively. 
The t-statistics are presented in brackets under the coefficients. 
 
 
The results for the two-year cash holdings in Table VI are similar to the results in Table 
V: all the coefficients are positive but most of them do not show that cash holdings have a 
significant impact. Only when I run the estimation with a minimum of 15 observations per 
industry (in column (3)), controlling with past Acquisitions, I find the cash holdings to 
impact the future market share growth positively at a 10 percent significance level. A one 
 No. Of Firms 
>15 
 No. Of Firms 
>15 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
zCash t-2 0.009 0.004 0.017* 0.003
[1.589] [1.350] [1.889] [0.623]
Size t-1 -0.003 -0.071*** -0.103*** -0.099***
[-1.039] [-7.146] [-3.156] [-6.056]
Leverage t-1 -0.076 0.107*** 0.001 0.178***
[-1.037] [2.619] [0.008] [2.656]
Leverage t-2 -0.004 -0.104** -0.034 -0.139**
[-0.059] [-2.539] [-0.272] [-2.017]
∆MarketShare t-1 0.166*** -0.011 0.000 -0.021
[6.911] [-0.836] [0.004] [-0.961]
∆MarketShare t-2 0.029 -0.092*** -0.070* -0.089**
[1.235] [-6.994] [-1.779] [-4.236]
Acquisitions t-1 0.284*** 0.465***
[4.010] [4.024]
Acquisitions t-2 -0.036 0.222**
[-0.553] [2.123]
Market-to-Book t-1 -0.000** -0.001***
[-2.108] [-2.973]
Market-to-Book t-2 0.000 0.001*
[1.526] [1.733]
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Of Obs. 2,069 6,420 888 2,831
R
2
0.366 0.356 0.429 0.382
IV cash holdings effect
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standard deviation increase in cash holdings relative to rivals increases the market share 
by 1.7%. The results for the past Acquisitions are mainly positive. The one year past 
Acquisitions improve the market share significantly. In columns (1) and (3), the 
Acquisitions do not change the setting for the cash holdings but the main change is the 
coefficient of Leverage. The significant and positive impact of one-year lagged Leverage 
is missing in columns (1) and (3). The same impact is missing in the estimations where I 
use Market-to-Book ratio as the additional control variable. I find positive coefficients for 
the one year past Acquisitions both from the estimation in column (1) and from the robust 
check in column (3). They are 0.284 and 0.465, respectively and both of them are 
significant with a one percent significance level. For the two-year past figures my findings 
differ from the one-year past figures. Focusing on the same estimations, I first find 
insignificant negative results and then positive ones but with a 52% lesser impact. These 
results are in line with Mikkelson and Partch (2003) and Harford (1999) who propose that 
the impact of acquisitions turns negative with the two-year lagged figures. Fresard (2010) 
reports differing signs for the coefficients of past Acquisitions, also, but both signs have a 
significant impact in his findings. The explanatory power of the estimation also increases 
when I make the past acquisitions to explain the future market share development, from 
0.262 to 0.366.  
 
Fresard (2010) discovers that controlling the impact of cash holdings on market share 
development does not have any implications if past Market-to-Book- ratios are added into 
the analysis. My estimations for the coefficients of two-year lagged cash holdings hold 
positive and insignificant when I add past Market-to-Book figures. The variable does not 
change the impact of past Leverage like the Acquisitions did. Based on these results 
Market-to-Book ratios have almost zero effect for the future market share growth. One 
year past ratios in estimations (2) and (4) are significantly negative but close to zero (-
0.000 and -0.001, respectively). The findings for the two-year past figures are positive but 
they lose their significance. The coefficients are still close to zero, 0.000 and 0.001. These 
results imply that the expectations set for the firms in my sample did not realize in the 
market share development in the future. The situation is different in Fresard’s (2010) 
study where the ratios indicate positive development for market share growth.  
 
My findings vary compared to what Fresard (2010) finds from his data: the standardized 
cash holdings do not show the expected positive sign for zCasht-1, and the coefficients for 
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zCasht-2 in Table V are not significant at either 10%, 5% or 1% level. There is some weak 
evidence for the two-year lagged cash holdings in Table VI. This may result from many 
things. First, our samples differ in size, especially when it comes to the leverage 
observations. We both have used our own judgment in industry construction and 
specification. Second, Fresard (2010) uses a sample of 105 4-digit industries, I have used 
a sample of 149 3-or 4-digit industries. I construct my sample of industries that have a 
minimum of three firms. In the estimations I use variables that are constructed from at 
least five observations for industry averages and deviations. Fresard (2010) requires 
industry-years with at least 10 firm-year observations of cash, assets and sales. The 
industry construction is one of the most important cornerstones in this study and the sizes 
of the industries impact the industry-related figures both in market share increase and in 
standardized cash ratios. The industry construction with the SIC digits is a challenging 
task when it comes to describing the real competition.  
 
Third, the results might also be biased due to the original data source and its industry 
definitions for the firms observed. In my study I keep the SIC codes constant during the 
examination period because the primary SIC codes in the Thomson One Banker 
Worldscope hold during the period. It remains unclear whether Fresard (2010) adjusts the 
SIC codes for the firms observed every year and ranks the industries again. Fourth, in 
general, the description of the industry in which each firm observed operates might not 
tell the whole truth of because the primary SIC codes are usually determined by the 
biggest business unit sales of the firm. A significant part of the firm operations can be 
ignored. It would be interesting to see whether the cash holdings impact per business 
segment could be explained. Fifth, the difference of the time period could account for 
some arguments for the differences in the findings. My time scale runs from 1990 to 2009 
but Fresard (2010) has gathered his sample from earlier time periods, starting from 1976 
running to 2006.  
 
The last potential explanation for why the results differ might be the industry 
characteristics or the varying intensity of competition in different industries and markets. 
Fresard’s (2010) sample includes US based firms from the Compustat tapes. I retrieve 
data from 22 European countries and this increases the heterogeneity of the sample. 
Fresard’s (2010) results might give specific information only on American firms and 
reflect an underlying management culture of cash holdings and American competition. 
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The global vs. local industry aspect is also missing in Fresard’s (2010) study. Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz (2009) find that the cash balances of industrial US corporations have almost 
doubled since the 1980’s. This might be related with the cash holdings effect. 
 
 Cash holdings effect in France, Germany and the UK 6.1.2.
In this section, I run the baseline estimation with three subsamples constructed from one 
of the biggest European countries: France, Germany and the UK. The results in Section 
6.1.1 did not show any significant positive implications that cash holdings might have in 
future industry-related market share growth. I now hypothesize that the cash holdings 
impact stated in Hypothesis 1 holds regardless of the firm’s country of origin (Hypothesis 
2). The results in Section 6.1.1., show that cash holdings have a major impact on market 
share growth, so I now expect the coefficients for the country-specific estimations to show 
no significant findings. Still, I hypothesize that the effect should not be dissimilar in 
different countries and, based on Section 6.1.1, that it should not apply in any of the 
countries. 
 
It is worth to test the hypothesis with different countries as the heterogeneity of European 
countries in my sample is wide and I do not control the country specific fixed effects in 
the baseline estimation in Section 6.1.1. During the time period observed, from 1990 to 
2009, notably many of the East European countries have undergone major changes in their 
economic environment and financial legislation. Changes in foreign exchange currencies 
and joining the European Union could have influence the country specific effects.  
 
In this section I take France, Germany and the UK into focus as the data availability and 
quality of these countries is better. All these countries have experienced the changes 
mentioned above in their economies, as well. The three countries represent a more 
developed financial environment during the time span I will study, but they also differ 
from each other. The U.K can be classified as an Anglo- American country where firms 
have lower debt levels (Borio (1990)) and agency costs and bankruptcy costs are higher 
(Edward and Nibler (2000)). The countries can also differ in legislation, corporate 
governance, shareholder protection, ownership structure and cash holdings. 
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Ferreira and Vilela (2004) study the cash holdings of EMU countries and find that firms 
operating in countries with more developed capital markets tend to hold less cash. This is 
contrary to the agency costs view and consistent with view that firms build up cash for 
precautionary reasons. According to the features of their data Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
find that the ownership concentration is doubly higher in Germany than in France. The 
creditor rights are also higher in Germany than in France. On the contrary, in France the 
shareholder protection is higher based on an anti-director rights index created by La Porta 
et al. (1998). Guney et al. (2007) find similar results on ownership control and add that the 
concentration is substantially lower in the UK where both the creditor rights and anti-
director rights outpace both France and Germany.  
 
To estimate the coefficients for the cash holdings, I use the same instrumented and 
standardized cash holdings as in Section 6.1.1. (Table V). I then create the subsamples per 
country of France, Germany and the UK for the time period of 1990 to 2009. I test both 
the one- and two-year lagged cash holdings impact on future market share growth with the 
same control variables as in Table V. I allow the firm- and time-fixed effects in the 
regressions. The results are presented in Table VII. 
 
The findings for one- and two year lagged cash holdings in Table VII almost fully 
replicate the results in Table V for all the countries. The lagged standardized cash 
holdings do not show any meaningful positive impact on future industry-related market 
share in Germany and the UK. I find negative results for them for one-year lagged cash 
holdings, and positive ones for the two-year cash levels. Neither is significant. For France, 
the coefficient for the one-year lagged cash holdings is positive, though lacking in 
significance. The two-year lagged cash holdings of France thus differ and show weak 
evidence of the potential impact of cash holdings effect. The coefficient for the zCasht-2 is 
0.014 and significant with only a 10% level. Thus, the results for the coefficients of cash 
holdings mostly follow the pattern of baseline estimation in Table V. The one-year lagged 
cash holdings do not indicate any clear impact on the market share growth but the two-
year lagged cash holdings show weakly positive impact on future industry-related market 
share growth.  
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Table VII 
The Impact of Cash Holdings on Future Market Share Growth in France, Germany and the UK 
Table IX describes the baseline estimation of the cash holdings impact on industry-related market share growth in France, Germany and UK. The dependent variable, 
∆MarketShare, is the industry-related market share change. The main independent variable, zCash, is instrumented and standardized as in Table V. In columns 1, 2 and 3 
the baseline estimations for zCasht-1 are presented. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the estimations are run with zCasht-2. The table presents other control variables such as Size, past 
Leverage and past ∆MarketShare. The firm- and time-fixed effects are allowed. The time period is 1990 to 2009. I denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level with ***, 
** and *, respectively. The t-statistics are presented in brackets under the coefficients.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
zCash t-1 0.001 -0.010 -0.001
[0.175] [-0.970] [-0.188]
zCash t-2 0.014* 0.002 0.007
[1.867] [0.189] [1.069]
Size t-1 -0.068*** 0.001 -0.059* -0.001 -0.113*** 0.003
[-3.245] [0.256] [-1.738] [-0.206] [-6.360] [1.042]
Leverage t-1 0.147* -0.056 -0.317** 0.016 0.164** 0.171**
[1.679] [-0.597] [-2.144] [0.122] [2.019] [2.463]
Leverage t-2 -0.172** -0.038 0.187 -0.067 -0.216*** -0.215***
[-1.959] [-0.409] [1.205] [-0.531] [-2.716] [-2.993]
∆MarketShare t-1 0.003 0.208*** 0.030 0.282*** 0.010 0.119**
[0.095] [6.785] [0.605] [6.095] [0.413] [4.973]
dMarketShare t-2 -0.057* 0.079*** -0.088** -0.000 -0.095*** 0.040*
[-1.663] [2.691] [-2.007] [-0.002] [-4.100] [1.702]
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Of Obs. 1,126 1,102 586 541 2,085 1,954
R
2
0.360 0.277 0.429 0.347 0.373 0.261
France Germany U.K.
47 
 
 
The country specific estimations support my previous findings that the phenomenon is not 
worldwide but I cannot conclude that it would not be country dependent. Fresard (2010) 
finds strong evidence to support the hypothesis but I find no results significant enough 
among the biggest European economies, such as France, Germany and the UK. As the 
minor differences between the countries still exist they must relate to some cultural 
aspects. The features usually seen in Anglo-American countries cannot explain the 
differences in the results between Fresard’s (2010) findings and mine as such, because the 
UK has been usually classified as an Anglo-American country according to its 
characteristics. Either the general level of the cash holdings compared between Fresard’s 
(2010) data and my findings does not explain the different results in the country-specific 
point of view. Both the European and the US data are treated so that the industry-related 
measures are studied, both cash holdings and market share changes.  
 
The findings with the control variables in the country specific analysis (Table VII) are 
partly in line with the results in Table V. The impact of Size holds for all the countries in 
columns (1), (3) and (5) though only weakly for Germany, with a 10% significance level. 
The negative impact of Size disappears for France and the UK when I study the two-year 
lagged cash holdings instead of the one year lags. For Germany it holds but loses 
significance substantially. 
 
The other control variables show differing indications compared to Table V and Table VI 
in Section 6.1.1. The results in baseline estimation (Table V) indicated that the one year 
lag of leverage has a positive impact on future market share improvement but in longer-
term leverage turns out to be detrimental for firm performance. The impact of leverage in 
the country-specific regressions follows partially the results. The findings in columns (1), 
(5) and (6) present results of estimations for France and the UK where the one-year lagged 
Leverage shows positive impact for the future industry-related market share growth. The 
leverage loses its impact when the time period spans from t+1 to t+2. All the results are 
significant in these estimations. The results are weakest for France. Thus, the results of 
these three estimations support the main findings from the total sample as well as 
Campello’s (2006) findings where the leverage impact holds for one year but a prolonged 
high leverage hurts firm performance. For Germany, the setting holds insignificantly 
when I examine the two-year lagged cash holdings (see column (4) in Table VII). The 
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findings from the German data contradict the French and British sample. The coefficients 
are not in line and show a significant negative impact on the one-year lagged cash 
holdings, indicating that firms based in Germany suffer in short-term from high debt 
ratios.  
 
The results for the impact of the past market share on future market share development are 
very fragmented in the country-specific estimations. In columns (1), (3) and (5), for all the 
countries, the estimations show how the past market share improvements hold their one-
year momentum, though not significantly, and indicate a significantly negative impact 
when I examine the two-year lagged cash holdings. This pattern follows Fresard’s (2010) 
results though not with equivalent significance. The results in Table VII are contradictory, 
though, as I also find significantly positive impact from both past market shares for 
Germany and France when I study the two-year lagged cash holdings. I miss for any 
conclusions of the past market share in the country-specific analysis as the results are so 
diverge. 
 
To conclude all the country specific estimations, the results in Table VII support the doubt 
of the cash holdings impact on product market development to be any worldwide 
phenomenon. None of the countries report a strongly significant impact of the cash 
holdings to market share growth and they do not differ enough among each other to 
enable me to draw any meaningful country-specific conclusions. There is no strong 
evidence of any cash holdings effect on future market share growth. Still, I rely on these 
findings from French, German and British subsamples as they represent the data I use 
most comprehensively in this thesis. They also represent both typical Western European 
countries and an Anglo-American country.  
 
 Industry characteristics on cash holdings effect 6.1.3.
In this section, I focus on studying how the characteristics in and between industries and 
rivals impact the cash holdings effect on product market outcomes. My aim is first to 
replicate Fresard (2010) and to test whether the power of the impact differs depending on 
the competitiveness of an industry and the financial strength of competitors in it. Second, I 
test the empirical setting in Fresard’s (2010) research from the perspective of industry 
globalization. In contrast to his study, where the data is covered as one entirety without 
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separating the industries and firms which operate globally or only in the US market, I 
study whether the globalization of the industry alters the impact of cash holdings on 
market share growth.  
 
Industry and rival characteristics 
First, I test whether the cash holdings effect depends on the industry and rival 
characteristics as described in Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2. Fresard (2010) reports significantly 
differing results for subsamples formed by the rivals’ financial strength (Size, Age and 
Payout policy) and the industry’s competitiveness (Industry concentration and Similarity 
of operations). His results confirm the hypothesis that when rivals are financially weaker 
the cash holdings effect is significantly stronger, i.e. high cash holdings lead to future 
industry-related market share increase with the expense of the rivals. He reports likewise 
strong results when the industry is less concentrated according to the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman- index and when the Similarity of operations is high in the industry. The more 
competitive the market is the more useful the cash holdings should be strategically. This 
setting is closely related to predation. Supporting the impact of rival characteristics, 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) find that while suffering from financial constraints a firm 
might end up as a target of predation leading to cash rich firms trying to drive a firm out 
of the markets. A firm with high cash holdings can defend itself better against having to 
exit a market. 
 
Table VIII presents the findings of rival and industry characteristics. In Panel A, I first 
examine how the rival characteristics impact the cash holdings effect. I divide my total 
sample in every industry-year to “high” and “low” industries according to the financial 
strength of rivals measured with the industry’s average Size, Age and Payout ratio. I form 
the subsamples I will observe from the first and fourth quartiles. I run the baseline 
estimation for the subsamples to depict whether the cash holdings impact differs between 
the samples. My findings for the subsamples in Table VIII, Panel A, are in line with the 
results of standardized cash holdings in Section 6.1.1. I find both positive and negative 
results for the impact in the subsamples. However, the findings do not show any 
significant coefficients in any of the subsamples, and therefore there is no evidence that 
cash holdings have a positive impact on the industry-related market share growth 
(Hypothesis 1). 
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Table VIII 
The Impact of Rivals’ Financial Strength and Industry Characteristics 
 in Cash Holdings Impact on Market Share Growth 
Table VII describes the baseline estimation of the cash holdings impact on market share growth in different 
subsamples according to rivals and industry characteristics. The dependent variable, ∆MarketShare, is the 
industry-related market share change. The main independent variable, zCash, is instrumented and 
standardized as in Table V. The sample is grouped according to industry rivals’ Size, Age and Payout policy 
in Panel A, and according to the Industry concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman index) and Similarity of 
operations (industry adjusted capital labor ratio) in Panel B. The coefficient for zCasht-1 is presented for 
each group. The firm- and time-fixed effects are allowed. The time period is 1990 to 2009. I denote 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level with ***, ** and *, respectively. The t-statistics are presented in brackets under 
the coefficients. The number of observations are found under the t-statistics. 
 
 
The impacts of cash holdings are just slightly more negative in the subsamples which 
comprise of the industries where the rivals’ financial strength is weaker. In the subsample 
of Size, I report coefficients of -0.003 and -0.004 for the “low” and “high” subsamples, 
respectively. When I measure the financial strength with Age, the years before the years 
observed when a firm has a noted share price; I find a positive impact of cash holdings for 
the subgroup of younger firms, 0.002. However, the coefficient is not significant and I 
cannot conclude that cash holdings would give any strategic benefit for younger firms. 
The Payout policy, the payout ratio, seems to indicate similar results as Size; 
Low High
zCash t-1
Rival's size -0.003 -0.004
[-0.394] [-0.901]
1,772 1,722
Rival's age 0.002 -0.003
[0.346] [-0.472]
1,772 1,772
Rival's payout policy -0.000 -0.003
[-0.013] [-0.445]
1,762 1,772
Industry concentration (HHI) 0.003 -0.010
[0.475] [-1.531]
1,772 1,772
Similarity of operations -0.018** -0.010
[-2.569] [-1.556]
1,771 1,772
Panel A
Panel B
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insignificantly negative impact in both subsamples with a slightly less negative coefficient 
for the more financially constrained subsample.  
 
I take a similar approach in Panel B where I first group the industries according to their 
competitiveness measured with the Herfindahl- Hirschman- index. I place the industries in 
the lowest quartile measured with the HH index to the “low” subsample and the industries 
in the highest quartile to the “high” subsample. I create the subsamples of the similarity of 
operations by positioning the industries with the proxy for lower Similarity of operations 
in the “low” quartile and the industries with the proxy for the higher Similarity of 
operations in the “high” quartile. The industries in the “high” quartile represent industries 
where the operations are most similar in their technological structure and where the 
capital labor ratios of the firms are close to each other. This means firms organize their 
operations in a similar way that leads to tougher competition. I expect the cash holdings to 
have a stronger impact on industries where the competition is higher, i.e. the industries 
where the Industry concentration (HHI) is low and the Similarity of operations is higher. 
 
Concerning the Industry concentration (HHI), I find the cash holdings impact to be in the 
right direction, though weakly. The subsample of higher competition has a positive impact 
of cash holdings, 0.003, and the concentrated industries negative one, -0.010. The results 
are not significant in either subsample so it remains unclear whether there is a significant 
difference in the impacts of cash holdings in the subsamples. In the subsamples of 
Similarity of operations the coefficients for the relative to rivals cash holdings are both 
negative. The “low” subsample is the one where firms’ operations, in terms of their 
technological structure, are fragmented. These firms’ attempts to improve their future 
market share suffer from the high cash holdings. I find a significantly negative coefficient 
for the subsample, -0.018, with a 5% significance level. This result is in contrast to most 
of my findings which do not suggest that cash holdings would significantly hurt a firm’s 
market share growth. 
 
The results in Table VIII do not provide any firm evidence for either rejecting or 
accepting Hypotheses 3.1. and 3.2. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) found that financial 
distress can be costly in the product markets if a firm’s weakened condition induces an 
aggressive response from competitors that want to seize the opportunity to gain market 
share. This indicates that high cash holdings should act as a defensive strategic tool to 
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compete with and that its effect on e.g. future market share improvement should be 
stronger when the rivals are in a weaker condition. My findings are in conflict with this 
argument as they suggest that it cannot be proved that the rivals’ condition plays an 
important role on any potential cash holdings effect. 
 
The findings seem to be in contrast with other studies which suggest that the industry 
competition has an influence on the cash levels (see e.g. Haushalter (2007) and Campello 
(2006)). I suggest that the cash hoarding strategy of cash loses its efficiency if the 
competitiveness of an industry or the weak financial strength of competitors does not play 
a role in the cash holdings effect. This is supported by Fresard (2010) and Haushalter 
(2007), The predation risk and cash holdings can also be questioned. Froot et al. (1993) 
argued that if the investment opportunities are interdependent on certain product markets 
the un-hedged firms risk losing market share to competitors who are able to take on the 
investment opportunities with their higher internal funds. My findings do not support this 
theory due to the lack of significant evidence. 
 
Global and local industries 
Second, I extend the study of industry characteristics to examine whether the global and 
local industries both produce equally strong results for the cash holdings effect. Both my 
sample and the US sample in Fresard’s (2010) study are treated with the assumption that 
all firms belonging to an industry, according to a 3- or 4-digit SIC code; automatically 
compete in the same product markets. I take this assumption into focus and hypothesize 
that when industries are classified according to their SIC codes the firms in the industries 
might not necessarily compete with each other both locally, internationally and globally. 
Certain industries might be clearly global where the firm’s strategic actions in one country 
are affected by its operations and competitors’ actions in another country (Porter, 1980). 
Thus, even though the firm is located in one country its product markets might be 
worldwide. Kobrin (1991) argues that transnational integration appears when the benefits 
of integration across borders exceed the costs of a limited recognition of national social 
and political differences. The benefits result from specialization, interchange and scale. 
The definition for a global industry is based on the significance of the competitive 
advantage of international operations.  
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With the arguments mentioned above I conclude that not necessarily all industries are 
such that firms belonging to them can or do compete with each other. In certain industries 
the operations might be local and the firms might not compete of same customers or even 
in same geographical markets. Their strategic actions might differ substantially from those 
of the global industries. This raises the question of whether the sample and its industries 
are treated correctly. 
 
Next, I want to test whether the main hypothesis of the impact of cash holdings on future 
market share increase holds stronger in the subsample of global industries. To do this, I 
construct subsamples of the industries which operate globally and locally. When the 
locally operating industries are left out the actual competition in an industry is more 
realistic and correctly defined. The firms that operate locally might disturb in the original 
results for the total sample. I also run the baseline estimation with a sample including 
industries which operate locally to find whether the results differ from the sample of 
global industries. 
 
I create the subsamples based on the index formed by Kobrin (1991). He studies 56 
industries and creates the index by measuring the proportion of intrafirm international 
sales. The reasoning is based on the argument that the integration should be based on 
intrafirm exchanges of people, technology, raw materials, components and finished goods. 
He argues that the flows of different components are embodied in the flows of products 
and creates the index based on the intrafirm international sales. I base my subsample of 
global industry of the most transnationally integrated firms according to Kobrin’s (1991) 
classification, and to the local subsample accordingly. I match the industries of Kobrin 
(1991) with my sample defined with 3- and 4-digit SIC codes. The subsamples following 
Kobrin’s (1991) classification are presented in Appendix II. 
 
In Table IX, the baseline estimations for the subsamples of global and local industries are 
presented. I hypothesize that the cash holdings effect in global industries should be 
stronger than in the local industries due to the better specification of firms in a product 
market (Hypothesis 3.3.). My assumption that Fresard (2010) has treated his sample 
misleadingly without controlling the differences of the local and global industries has 
conflicting evidence. The results in Table IX show that the cash holdings effect of one-
year lagged standardized cash holdings among locally competing industries is 
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Table IX 
The Cash Holdings Impact on Future Market Share Growth in Global and Local Industries 
Table VIII describes the baseline estimation of the cash holdings impact on industry-related market share growth for subsamples of industries operating globally and 
locally. The dependent variable, ∆MarketShare, is the industry-related market share change. The main independent variable, zCash, is instrumented and standardized as 
in Table V. The table presents other control variables such as Size, past Leverage,past ∆MarketShare, Acquisitions and Market-to-Book. The firm- and time-fixed effects 
are allowed. I denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level with ***, ** and *, respectively. The t-statistics are presented in brackets under the coefficients. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
zCash t-1 -0.003 -0.006 -0.009* -0.010*
[-0.521] [-0.970] [-1.857] [-1.984]
zCash  t-2 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.008
[0.141] [0.015] [0.181] [-0.006] [1.456] [0.916] [1.332] [1.501]
Size t-1 -0.093*** -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.115*** -0.071*** -0.032* -0.032* -0.038** -0.096*** -0.058***
[-5.461] [-4.075] [-3.792] [-3.053] [3.895] [-1.865] [-1.791] [-2.071] [-2.721] [-3.146]
Leverage t-1 0.093 0.157** 0.165** 0.144 0.173** 0.088 0.057 0.057 -0.206 0.072
[1.204] [2.016] [2.126] [0.934] [2.150] [1.300] [0.796] [0.829] [-1.461] [0.957]
Leverage t-2 -0.012 -0.064 -0.077 -0.161 -0.099 -0.030 -0.054 0.022 0.103 -0.066
[-0.152] [-0.830] [-1.013] [-1.036] [-1.228] [-0.453] [-0.771] [0.328] [0.694] [-0.893]
∆MarketShare t-1 0.021 0.009 0.008 -0.096*** -0.091*** -0.096***
[0.923] [0.370] [0.351] [-3.851] [-3.525] [-3.642]
∆MarketShare t-2 -0.096*** -0.091*** -0.104*** -0.156*** -0.147*** -0.144***
[-4.280] [-4.014] [-4.548] [-6.723] [-6.056] [-5.758]
Acquisitions t-1 0.547*** 0.370**
[3.730] [2.575]
Acquisitions t-2 0.262** 0.032
[1.982] [0.261]
Market-to-Book t-1 0.000 -0.000
[0.443] [-0.327]
Market-to-Book t-2 -0.000 0.001
[-0.579] [0.751]
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Of Obs. 2,105 1,989 1,949 502 1,937 2,045 1,900 1,813 632 1,795
R2 0.413 0.408 0.405 0.508 0.384 0.345 0.328 0.330 0.385 0.318
Global industries Local industries
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significantly negative, -0.009(column (6). But among globally operating industries the 
significance is missing. The coefficient is nonetheless negative, -0.003 in column (1). The 
two-year lagged cash holdings do not show any significant impact on the future market 
share growth in either of the subsamples (see column (2) for global industries and (7) for 
local industries). The results do not support the findings of Fresard (2010) for the cash 
holdings impact in either of the subsamples. My findings are not significant enough to 
support my hypotheses that the cash holdings impact is more intensely present among 
globally operating industries (Hypothesis 3.3.). 
 
The control variables indicate similar impacts as in Section 6.1.1. on the market share 
growth in both of the subsamples. The Size of the firm indicates a negative impact on the 
future market share growth in both of the subsamples. The findings are consistent through 
all estimations and are statistically significant for all of them. The Leverage impact 
follows a similar path in all the subsample estimations, as in Section 6.1.1. The one-year 
lagged Leverage shows positive results in all estimations except one. Hence, for the global 
industries I find significant impact in estimations (2) and (3), 0.157 and 0.165 
respectively. The impact on local industries is not significant, although it is mostly 
positive. This might reflect the differences in the size of the firms in local industries and 
their fewer possibilities to raise debt finance and use leverage as a strategic tool. For the 
two-year lagged Leverage I find a negative coefficient in almost all estimations, although 
it is not significant. 
 
The past market share impact on the future market share development shows a strong 
difference between the subsamples. In the globally operating industries, the results are 
partially in line with Fresard’s (2010) findings. The one year past performance does show 
a positive but not a significant impact. The two-year past performance shows significant 
negative implications. On the other hand, firms in locally operating industries seem to 
suffer from the positive past performance. The findings imply that both the one and two 
year lagged market share growth has negative consequences for the future market share 
growth.  
 
Acquisitions seem to lead the market share growth in both of the classified industries, 
especially the acquisitions made in the previous year. My findings seem to indicate a 
positive impact of 0.547 and 0.370 for the global and local industries, respectively. Kobrin 
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(1991) argues that what is actually global in a firm’s operations is the underlying 
technology and economic activity. The national markets will at some point get too small 
on the way of growth. This implies that the locally operating industries are not seeking 
huge technological growth; instead, they most probably grow by acquiring their 
competitors. This might explain the Acquisitions’ impact in both of the subsamples. 
Market-to-Book ratios seem to be irrelevant in both of the subsamples for the market share 
development and do not provide any further insight for the cash holdings impact between 
the compared industry characteristics. 
 
My analysis of the differences between globally and locally operating industries does not 
provide evidence for my assumption of Fresard’s (2010) misleading treatment of his US 
sample. The primary interest of finding stronger results for the cash holdings impact 
among the globally operating industries does not receive supportive evidence. My 
findings leave the question of the industry characteristic open and I am not able to either 
reject or accept the hypothesis I have stated (Hypothesis 3.3.).  
 
6.2. Cash Holdings Effect in a Financial Crisis 
The recent financial crisis that started in 2007, hit the word economy with more strength 
than any had done in one hundred years. The crisis ended up tightening the credit supply 
for several years and in the end reduced the consumers’ confidence in the economy 
around the world. The crisis has been a target of deep analysis in the financial markets, 
and it has brought a new perspective for testing financial models in the recent financial 
academic literature. All the time, new evidence is found of both the financial status of the 
economy and its participants, as well as of the economic occurrences. In this section, I 
study cash holdings and market share growth in the light of the recent financial crisis. My 
focus is to examine the relation between the cash holdings before the crisis (before the 
beginning of 2008) and market share changes during 2008 and 2009. I first briefly review 
some academic findings of the period and then run the baseline estimation from Section 
6.1.1. I will do both by using the previously used control variables and by controlling the 
estimation with past Acquisitions. I conclude this section with a discussion of my findings 
in the light of the recent literature of the financial crisis and its implications.  
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The recent financial crisis changed the cash levels on firms’ balance sheets drastically, 
and the actions of firms concerning investments and product market behavior changed 
accordingly. Campello et al. (2010) conclude from their survey of Chief Financial 
Officers worldwide that the cash holdings of financially distressed firms fell about one 
fifth in one year ending to the peak of the crisis in the end of 2008. They also suggest that 
these firms managed to burn another 15% of their cash holdings during the crisis in 2009. 
The decreased cash levels also had an impact on investments during the period. Duchin et 
al. (2010) study corporate investment activity, measured in capital expenditure, in the 
edge of the financial crisis. They find that the crisis created a shock where the investments 
declined by 6.4% following the onset of the crisis in 2007. The decline was most drastic 
for firms which had low cash reserves or high short-term debt before the crisis. A one-
standard deviation increase in cash reserves before the crisis mitigated the decline by 58% 
compared to the decline for a zero-cash firm. Duchin et al.’s (2010) findings on the 
importance of internal resources for corporate investment during the subprime crisis are 
consistent with previous models, e.g. with Campello’s (2003) results. Campello (2003) 
suggests that firms which rely more heavily on external financing are more likely to 
reduce their investment in market share building during downturns and that the 
competitive outcomes resulting from such actions are jointly determined by the firm’s and 
by its rival’s capital structures. Hence, the interest for cash holdings and other ways to 
improve the position in product markets is even more important because the investment 
activity is clearly lower during the crisis. 
 
One of my motivations to focus on this time period is that the product market outcomes 
during the crisis are yet extensively unexplored. My objective is to bring some light in this 
topic with data from the crisis period and from the perspective of competition between 
European firms. Fresard (2010) concluded his study by stating that he’s results should be 
visible after the financial crisis ends and the winners and losers of the downturn are 
known. The cash holdings should have a heavier impact when the conditions of the 
surrounding environment change for all the competitors in product markets. A working 
paper of Byoun and Xu (2011) indicates that firms that relied on internal funding prior to 
the crisis in 2007 have increased their market share relative to their competitors dependent 
on external financing during the crisis. This is the only pre-investigation of this time 
period that relates to my topic of cash holdings. I expect to find results supporting Byoun 
and Xu’s (2011) current findings and the expectations of Fresard (2010). 
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Because I want to study whether the predictions of Fresard (2010) and Byoun and Xu 
(2011) hold with my European sample, I run a time series for the baseline estimation 
(equation (7)) to study the market share growth in years 2008 and 2009. I use the 
standardized relative to rivals cash holdings defined in Table V and focus on the relation 
of one-, two-, and three-year lagged cash holdings, i.e. cash holdings in the end of 2005, 
2006 and 2007. In Table X, I present the results of the pre-crisis cash holdings impact on 
product market outcomes during the crisis. 
Table X 
The Impact of Cash Holdings on Market Share Growth  
during the Financial Crisis from 2008 to 2009 
Table X describes the baseline estimation of the cash holdings impact on industry-related market share 
growth in the recent financial crisis. The dependent variable, ∆MarketShare, is the industry-related market 
share change. The main independent variable, zCash, is instrumented and standardized as in Table V. The 
industry-related market share changes, ∆MarketShare, are measured from years 2008 and 2009. The table 
presents other control variables such as Size, past Leverage and past ∆MarketShare. The firm- and time-
fixed effects are allowed. The time period is from 1990 to 2009. I denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
level with ***, ** and *, respectively. The t-statistics are presented in brackets under the coefficients.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
zCash t-1 -0.002 0.018* 0.022**
[-0.289] [1.943] [2.300]
zCash t-2 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.021*** 0.016**
[3.168] [3.672] [2.869] [2.516]
zCash t-3 0.017* 0.012
[1.850] [1.377]
Size t-1 -0.129** -0.120** -0.117** -0.126** -0.126**
[-2.553] [-2.377] [-2.335] [-2.503] [-2.514]
Leverage t-1 0.173* 0.172* 0.188* 0.177* 0.166
[1.663] [1.669] [1.823] [1.707] [1.606]
Leverage t-2 0.116 0.112 0.124 0.126 0.117
[0.994] [0.964] [1.072] [1.089] [1.005]
∆MarketShare t-1 -0.431*** -0.425*** -0.423*** -0.425*** -0.427***
[-10.383] [-10.321] [-10.270] [-10.304] [-10.342]
∆MarketShare t-2 -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.350*** -0.349***
[-9.218] [-9.271] [-9.304] [-9.284] [-9.265]
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Of Obs. 1,467 1,467 1,467 1,467 1,467
R
2
0.715 0.720 0.721 0.719 0.718
IV cash holdings effect
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I allow the firm and time fixed effects as before. Additional control variables are used to 
control the cash holdings influence on future industry-related market share growth. I 
expect them to reflect both the previous results in Section 6.1.1. and the economic 
situation of the time period. 
 
In Table X, column (5), my findings differ partly from the results of the baseline 
estimation in Section 6.1.1. Yet, they support the findings of Byoun and Xu (2011) and 
the expectations of Fresard (2010). I find results for the two-year lagged cash holdings 
which show a positive and significant impact for the future industry-related market share 
improvement. The two-year lagged cash holdings show a 1.6% increase in the market 
share with a 5% significance level when the cash holdings increase by one standard 
deviation from the industry average before the crisis. I find all the lagged cash holdings, 
one-, two- and three-years, to have a positive and significant impact on market share 
during the crisis. The economic interpretation for the estimation (3) in Table X is that a 
one standard deviation increase in cash holdings in relation to rivals in the same industry 
in year t-1 and t-2 leads to a 5.9% market share growth between t and t-1. When I control 
the two-year lagged cash holdings with the three year figures (column 4), one standard 
deviation in cash holdings in year t-2 leads to a 2.1% increase in market share between 
years t and t-1. The result is significant with a 1% percent significance level.  
 
My regression estimate for the one-year lagged cash holdings (column 1) is in line with 
the baseline estimation in the previous sections. I do not find any significantly positive 
results; instead, the results indicate that the one-year lagged cash holdings alone do not 
alone have any impact on market share growth. The sample yields a slightly negative 
coefficient for zCasht-1. Fresard’s (2010) results and his prediction for the financial crisis 
are not supported with the one-year lagged cash holdings, but the two-year lagged cash 
holdings support the expectations strongly. To summarize, my results in Table X predict 
that the product market performance during the recent financial crisis was highly 
dependent on the cash balances firms carried before the crisis started, especially the ones 
in the end of 2006 and 2007. 
 
I find positive impact for Leverage in all of the estimations, also for the two-year lagged 
cash holdings. This is in contrast with my earlier findings in the previous sections. The 
impact of one-year lagged Leverage is significant only with the 10% significance level in 
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columns (1) to (5). The leverage loses its minor significance in a year but it does not turn 
negative as in my previous findings. The results support the argument that firms that  had 
more leverage on their balance sheet in the beginning of the crisis have not suffered from 
the tightened credit supply during the crisis as much as others. For the firm Size, my 
results seem to indicate a negative and significant impact on market share growth as 
before. The results are significant at a 5% significance level in all my estimations 
(columns (1) to (5) in Table X).  
 
Besides the leverage, the past market shares also reflect the nature of the financial crisis, 
as I expect them to. For both the one- and two-year lagged industry-related market share 
increases lead to negative changes in the future, as presented in all columns (1) to (5) in 
Table IX. This reflects the contraction of the economic activity during the crisis. In my 
European sample the median sales growth from the end of 2007 to the end of 2009 was 
only -0.1%. The results support this trend. The explanatory power of my estimations also 
increases when I apply the regression model for this time period, producing an 
explanatory power of a minimum of 0.7. for each estimation. In general, the results in 
Table X indicate that cash holdings have had a positive and significant impact on short-
term industry-related market share growth whereas the leverage effect has lost its 
significance, but not its positive impact during the crisis. My findings strongly support 
accepting the hypothesis that cash holdings have a stronger impact during an economic 
downturn than in a longer time period in general (Hypothesis 4).  
 
The acquisition activity during the crisis dropped drastically and that has been also 
empirically shown. Duchin et al. (2010) report the decline in investments to be most sharp 
for firms which had low cash reserves or high short-term debt before the crisis. Campello 
et al. (2010) find, through their survey for CFOs worldwide, that all kinds of firms are 
likely to use internal sources of funding for their investment when the access to external 
capital markets is limited. The firms consider their internal sources as a way to finance 
future investments when they face a negative credit supply shock. The CFOs also 
indicated that they are likely to postpone or cancel the investment plans in this kind of 
economic situation. For example, 86% of the financially constrained firms report a 
disability to invest in positive NPV projects in the recent financial crisis (Campello 
(2010)). The crisis has also received opposing arguments in the field of investments. The 
recent working paper of Byoun and Xu (2011) report that the market share increase of the 
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independent finance firms during the crisis is related to their abnormal investment 
activity. Based on these results I continue the examination of cash holdings and market 
share growth in the financial crisis. I run the estimations for the financial crisis period and 
now control the cash holdings impact with past Acquisitions. I expect the cash holdings to 
hold their impact regardless of the acquisitions. I also anticipate the acquisition activity 
not to play an essential role in the future industry-related market share improvement based 
on Duchin et al.’s (2010) results.  
 
The results in Table XI support my expectations. I find that the relative to rivals cash 
holdings still has a significant impact for the future market share growth during the crisis 
regardless of controlling the impact with Acquisitions. In Table XI, the two-year lagged 
cash holdings hold their significantly positive impact in all the estimations when I control 
them with both the one- and two- year past acquisitions. The impact holds with a 1% 
significance level. In columns (1) and (2), a one standard deviation increase in cash 
holdings relative to rivals in year t-2 yields a 6.9% and 6.5% increase in market share in 
year t, respectively. The impacts are 4.5% and 4.4% in columns (3) and (4), when I leave 
the one-year lagged cash holdings out of the regression. Acquisitions do not to have a 
major influence on the market share growth during the crisis. In columns (2), (3) and (4) I 
report a positive, but not nearly a significant impact for acquisitions. The acquisitions are 
not in a key role in the market share improvement during the crisis and they do not change 
the findings of the cash holdings already explored in Table X, either. 
 
My previous findings on Size, Leverage and past market share, ∆Market Share, partly 
hold when I control the estimations with past Acquisitions. Differences compared to Table 
X depend on the timing of the past Acquisitions, t-1 or t-2. In columns (1) and (3) Size has 
a negative and significant impact on the market share change what confirms the results in 
Table X. With a 1% significance level I find Size to decrease the market share in both 
estimations. In columns (2) and (4), Size has a significant and positive impact which might 
reflect the past Acquisitions in t-2 with a delay. The past market shares again reflect the 
general trend of diminishing sales during the crisis. Both one and two year past market 
share growth has a negative outcome for the future development in market share. The 
impacts are significantly negative with 1% significance level in all estimations. The 
results for Leverage are fragmented. I find positive and significant results in estimations 
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(1) and (3). Otherwise the impact of Leverage is insignificant and shows both positive and 
negative impacts.  
Table XI 
The Impact of Cash Holdings on Market Share Growth during  
the Financial Crisis 2008 to 2009 with Acquisitions 
Table XI describes the baseline estimation of the cash holdings impact on industry-related market share 
growth in the recent financial crisis with Acquisitions. The dependent variable, ∆MarketShare, is the 
industry-related market share change. The main independent variable, zCash, is instrumented and 
standardized as in Table V. The industry-related market share changes, ∆MarketShare, are measured from 
years 2008 and 2009. The table presents Aqcuisitions in addition to other control variables such as Size, past 
Leverage and past ∆MarketShare. The firm- and time-fixed effects are allowed. The time period is from 
1990 to 2009. I denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level with ***, ** and *, respectively. The t-statistics 
are presented in brackets under the coefficients.  
 
 
 
The results in Table XI emphasize the meaningful role of cash holdings in a financial 
crisis. My findings provide evidence that cash can have an impact on the market share 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
zCash t-1 0.039** 0.030*
[2.365] [1.917]
zCash t-2 0.069*** 0.065*** 0.042*** 0.044***
[4.011] [3.722] [3.227] [3.220]
zCash t-3 0.040** 0.040** 0.027 0.032*
[2.151] [2.143] [1.484] [1.741]
Size t-1 -0.229** 0.298** -0.253*** 0.280***
[-2.508] [3.104] [-2.765] [2.908]
Leverage t-1 0.614*** -0.348 0.589*** -0.338
[3.221] [-1.642] [3.060] [-1.586]
Leverage t-2 -0.158 0.196 -0.099 0.278
[-0.701] [0.842] [-0.438] [1.209]
∆MarketShare t-1 -0.480*** -0.541*** -0.488*** -0.531***
[-5.859] [-7.123] [-5.891] [-6.959]
∆MarketShare t-2 -0.361*** -0.389** -0.364*** -0.387***
[-4.498] [-5.832] [-4.493] [-5.752]
Acquisitions t-1 -0.004 0.016
[-0.024] [0.090]
Acquisitions t-2 0.002 0.003
[0.014] [0.017]
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Of Obs. 626 608 626 608
R
2
0.760 0.783 0.754 0.779
IV cash holdings effect
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growth during a time when the acquisition activity decreases drastically. Firms prefer to 
use cash to advance their position in the product market. This is done through 
improvements in operations rather than investing in acquisitions or other investment 
targets with a positive net present value during a crisis. This is supported by the findings 
in Table V which do not give support for cash holdings but for acquisitions to contribute 
to the future market share growth during longer time periods. Instead, the findings in 
Table X and Table XI give differing results for cash holdings and acquisitions with 
significant findings for cash holdings and insignificant ones for acquisitions during the 
crisis. Firms having more cash in their balance sheet than their industry peers are willing 
to use them to ensure and even to improve their market share during a downturn.  
 
My findings regarding the financial crisis are in line with the expectation that firms with 
internal resources are less affected by the financial crisis. Byoun and Xu (2011) suggest 
that there is a shift of market share from the firms dependent on external finance to the 
firms handling with internal finance. Their coefficient estimates for the internal finance 
dependent firms are significantly positive, indicating that these firms gain more market 
share relative to their external finance dependent competitors during the crisis. Their and 
my results support the predatory theory of financially sound firms acting to drive their 
financially weaker peers out of the markets. 
 
The results also support other theories related to cash holdings. It seems that the findings 
from the financial crisis also support the precautionary motive for cash holdings. Lins et 
al. (2010) argued based on their survey that Chief Financial Officers hold non-operational 
cash for precautionary purposes to defend their firms against unexpected shocks. My 
findings in both Table X and Table XI indicate that precautionary cash holdings are a 
sound way to hedge against economic shocks affecting the product market position. This 
supports Fresard’s (2010) argument that cash holdings have a substantial strategic 
dimension. 
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7. Conclusions 
7.1. Results 
The purpose of my thesis is to find new evidence of the implications of cash holdings. My 
primary focus is to study whether the relative to rivals cash holdings have any significant 
impact on future industry-related product market growth. I study this hypothesis in four 
dimensions. In addition to studying the impact in general, I focus on what the impacts of 
country of origin, industry characteristics and the recent financial crisis to the cash 
holdings effect are. I use data of 22 European countries for the analysis. I replicate the 
methods of Fresard (2010) who for the first time focuses on the strategic effects of cash 
holdings on product market outcomes. 
 
My findings partially support the assumption that the lagged cash holdings improve a 
firm’s future industry-related market share. I find that during the recent financial crisis a 
one standard deviation increase in the two-year lagged relative to rivals cash holdings 
increases the market share in 2008 and 2009 between 1.6% to 6.9% (see Tables X and 
XI). The significantly positive impact holds when I control it with one- and three-year 
lagged cash holdings and other control variables, such as Size, Leverage, past 
∆MarketShare and Acquisitions. The impact of cash holdings on the market share growth 
during the whole study period of 1990 to 2009 does not seem to provide as strong 
evidence. For the whole period observed in my baseline estimation I find no significant 
evidence for the cash holdings. My findings indicate, though without any significance, 
that one year lagged cash holdings interact negatively, and the two-year lagged cash 
holdings positively with the future market share changes. The results differ also 
depending on the control variables I use.  
 
Studying the cash holdings impact from the point of view of country of origin and 
industry characteristics also gives weak results. The results for the baseline estimation in a 
separate analysis for France, Germany and the UK do not provide any strong evidence of 
the cash holdings impact in either of the countries. I find only weak evidence, at a 10% 
significance level, of the two-year lagged cash holdings for France. They seem to improve 
the future market share growth by 1.4% per a standard deviation increase in the relative to 
rivals cash holding. The industry characteristics do not lead to differing results for the 
cash holdings. Neither the rivals’ financial constraints nor the industry concentration play 
65 
 
 
an important role in defining the cash holdings effect. My results in any of the opposite 
subsamples of these measures do not give evidence that the cash holdings impact the 
future industry-related market share growth. Based on my data it cannot be verified 
whether the industry’s intensity of competition or the rivals’ financial constraints affect 
the potential relation of cash holdings and market share development. My focus on the 
differences between global and local industries does not provide any new insight on the 
cash holdings impact either. The findings for the global and local industry subsamples do 
not show evidence for the relation of cash holdings and market share growth. My 
hypothesis that the globally operating industries show the effect more clearly is not 
supported. Table XII summarizes my hypotheses and the results of the empirical analysis.  
 
Table XII 
Summary of the Hypotheses and Results 
Table XII summarized the hypotheses and the results. The hypotheses are presented in the Section 3 and the 
results presented in Section 6. All the empirical results are studied with econometric regression methods 
with panel data from a European sample of 22 countries. 
 
 
The implications of my thesis for the cash holdings literature are two-fold. First, I 
conclude from the analysis of the empirical results that the cash holdings impact on future 
Results
1. High industry-related cash holdings lead to future industry-
related market share growth
No evidence
2. High industry-related cash holdings lead to future industry-
related market share growth regardless of a firm’s country of 
origin
No evidence
3.1. The weaker the competitor’s financial status, the stronger the 
impact of cash holdings on the industry-related market share 
growth (Rival’s characteristics)
No evidence
3.2. The higher the competition in an industry, the stronger the impact 
of cash holdings on the industry-related market share growth 
(Industry characteristics)
No evidence
3.3. The cash holdings effect on future industry-related market share 
growth is stronger among industries operating globally than 
locally operating industries
No evidence
4. Given the conditions in the recent financial crisis, the cash 
holdings effect on future industry-related market share growth is 
stronger than in a normal time period
Accept
Hypothesis
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market share growth does not, as such, represent a worldwide phenomenon. This is 
supported by the lack of evidence for the impact in the European sample for the total 
study period from 1990 to 2009. My results are weak and not plausible enough to support 
earlier findings. Fresard’s (2010) results of the strategic effect of cash holdings must 
originate from some country specific factors or other factors not present in my data. 
Second, although my results for the cash holdings impact on future market share growth 
in general are fragmented and weak, I find valuable results for the time period of the 
recent financial crisis. I provide new evidence for the discussion of the recent financial 
crisis in the light of precautionary cash holdings and predation risk. My findings suggest 
that the hoarding strategy of cash for precautionary purposes has its benefits during a 
credit crisis. Keynes (1936), Lins et al. (2010) and Campello (2010) argue that firms holds 
cash for precautionary purposes against unexpected shocks in cash flows. My results 
support the efficiency of this strategy and give relevance for the motive. The results also 
contribute to the literature on predation risk. As the relative to rival cash holdings lead to 
industry related market share improvement during the crisis a firm can realize a cash 
holdings strategy where it aims to drive other participants out of the product market 
competition during a downturn. This aspect of the cash holdings supports the findings of 
e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Froot et al. (1993) and Haushalter (2007).  
 
7.2. Limitations of the study 
The main limitations of my study relate to my European data features and methods which 
might cause the contradictory results. The partly fragmented results might be due to 
features in the data and the methods I use for the creation of the industries. My European 
sample consists of firms which are more leveraged than those of Fresard’s (2010) US 
data. My sample also lacks of the amount of observations that Fresard (2010) has in his 
research. The difference is important because it diminishes the firm-observations and 
changes the data setting so that the regression model has fewer observations to use for the 
formation of time- and fixed effects. If these effects are assessed incorrectly enough the 
estimates for the coefficients of the explanatory variables can be miscalculated also.  
 
The other important limitation is the method used for the creation of the industries to 
estimate the industry-related variables, ∆Market Share and ∆Cash. Fresard (2010) follows 
a principle of industries defined with SIC codes at the 4-digit level. My industries are 
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based on 3- or 4-digits to better represent the data and to create enough industries with a 
required amount of firm-observations in them. I require a minimum of five firm-year 
observations for the industry-related variables. Although this small amount of observation 
might cause some unwelcomed noise in the results, my findings in the robust check, with 
a minimum of 15 firm-year observations per industry, do not change the insignificance of 
the results. The primary SIC codes used for the analysis are defined by the data source, 
Thomson One Banker system. The determination of the SIC codes for multi-divisional 
firms might also lead to errors in the industry formation and in the description of the real 
competition among firms. It remains open also whether Fresard (2010) has used fixed SIC 
codes for the firms throughout the examination period as I do. This affects the industry 
formation greatly. 
 
7.3. Suggestions for further research 
The outcomes of my study bring in light many aspects of cash holdings and product 
markets which propose further investigation of the subject. As the results are two-folded 
between the general outcomes of the cash holdings impact and the findings from the 
recent financial crisis, the future studies should focus on two main topics. First, the 
differences in the results raise questions of the optimal level of cash holdings to control 
for agency problems, and of the efficiency of the cash holdings. My results suggest that 
there is no evidence that the relative to rivals cash holdings would to lead into any 
significant market share growth in general. Still, I find that in a downturn the cash 
holdings are valuable for product market outcomes. Hoarding cash is not useful according 
to my analysis but it is worth it if the economy faces a recession or limitations in credit 
supply. For the future discussion it would be worth to analyze the optimal level of cash, 
given these results.  
 
Second, I suggest that further attention should be paid on the recent financial crisis from 
the product markets’ point of view. The significant impact of cash holdings on market 
share growth during the credit crisis is worth to unfold. My study is confined to find out 
whether the relation exists at all and further studies could focus on finding the actions that 
firms take to use the cash holdings in order to ensure their product market success. As the 
recession serves also a good timing to launch new innovations and change consumer 
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behavior
9
, it would be fruitful to discover the behavior of the cash piling survivors in the 
financial crisis more deeply. 
                                                          
9
 See “Desperately seeking a cash cure”, Economist, 20th November 2008. 
(www.economist.com/node/12636353?story_id=E1_TNGPGPVP) 
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Appendix I 
Country Split of the Sample 
The sample is constructed from public firms from 22 European countries which are members of the 
European Union or the European Economic Area. All firms of these countries have observations from sales, 
assets and cash. 
 
  
Country
Austria 82
Lithuania 15
Latvia 14
Belgium 76
Bulgaria 13
Czech Republic 1
Denmark 91
Finland 96
France 515
Germany 532
Greece 136
Hungary 21
Iceland 4
Ireland 34
Italy 191
Luxembourg 14
The Netherlands 114
Norway 106
Poland 154
Portugal 40
Slovakia 20
Slovenia 2
Spain 91
Sweden 231
Switzerland 154
The United Kingdom 1023
Total 3770
Nbr. Of Firms
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Appendix II 
Global and local industries 
The Appendix II presents the industries used to study the difference between the local and global industries. 
The subsample construction is relating to the industry classification of Korbin (1991) according to the index 
of transnational integration. The first and last quartiles of the transnationally integrated industries are used 
for the samples of global and local industries. The SIC codes for these industries are matched for the sample 
construction.  
 
 
Global industries SIC Code
Computers 3 570
Motor vehicles 3710
Medical instruments 3840
Photographic equipment 3860
farm machinery 3520
Communications equipment 3660
Apparel 2300
Industrial chemicals 2810, 2860
Non-ferrous metals 3330, 3340, 3350, 3360
Screw machine products 3450
Engines 3510
Metalworking machines 3540
Electronic components 3610, 3620, 3640, 3650, 3670
Scientific measuring instruments 3820
Local industries SIC Code
Paper boxes 2650
Leather products 3100
Ferrous metals 3310, 3320
Fabricated metals 3410, 3420, 3440, 3450, 3470, 
3480, 3490Preserved fruits and vegetables 2030
Dairy products 2020
Grain mill products 2040
Beverages 2080
Machinery (except electrical) 3530, 3550, 3560, 3590
Other food products 2050
Forgings 3460
Plumbing 3430
Pulp and paper 2610, 2620
Household appliances 3630
